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CH.APTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the international politics of the past and present centuries 
Southeast· Asia has interacted with the major political forces.· of· the 
times. Starting with the era of European colonialism which dominated 
the area in the nineteenth century, the international relations of this 
region were determined in the far~away.capital cities of France, Great 
Britain, the Netherlands, and the United .States. Nineteenth-century 
colonialism, even with its idealistic aspects, produced political, ancl 
in many respects, economic, social,..and cultural patterns that lacked 
the elements of permanence. Wiped out by the Japanese army during World 
War II, and coupled with the rise of its greatest foe--nationalism of 
the twentieth c~ntury--the European powers, including the United States, 
had to adjust for better or worse to the loss of all or most of .their 
possessions.in Southe~st Asia. 
The Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, 
and South and North Vietnam have joined Thailand in the family of sov~ 
ereign nations. As these countries achieved their independence, a new 
pattern of international relations,.emerged in Southeast Asia after the 
1 Second World War. A power.vacut,.Unwas created because of the.declining 
influence of the Western powers •. In an effort to fill this vacuum in 
the latter part of the 1950's andthroughout.the 1960's, United States 
power has replaced that of the British and the French in the area as 
1 
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Southeast Asia came to be an activer.egion in. the struggle between the 
Communist and Western forces. The Korean war.from 1~50 to 1953 and the. 
Indochina war from 1946 to 1954 were international.cenflicts that had a 
significant impact on Southeast Asia •. For the first time the.people of. 
this region came to realize how big-,power conflicts:threatened their 
interests. This threat became even more profound when the Vietnamese 
civil war broke out in the.early 1960's. 
The United States' foreign policy toward Southeast Asia has been 
the major obstacle against the threat .of Communist states.in the area; 
it has been successful in the sense that today there are still a number 
of "free" states that have been able to evade Communist ta~e-over. The 
United States' foreign policy has been designed to deny China the rich 
resources of the.area, to preserve the. independence of the established 
states, both old and new; and to promote foreign policies favorable 1;:o 
the Weste;rn bloc by the governments of. the Southeast Asian states. _tB1:1t 
the United States' commitment .to protect this region has been too costly, 
both in terms of manpower and material resources. Thus, changes in 
American foreign policy are evolving. The Nixon Doctrine2 is a mani-
festatiot1, of these,changes. The Doctrine calls for a.long overdue re-
exa.tnination of the recent past and rev.eals the intention to work out a 
new set of relationships with allies, .friends and er~twhile foes on the. 
basis of perceived United States interests. This is evident in the 
more recent rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. The 
United States has made it clear that. the .. defense and development .. of 
other countries must be, first, the .responsibility of the individual 
state and, sec~md, of the region .that the particular state concerned 
3 belongs to. If United States interests .are involved, military and 
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economic aid may be.extended, but only·to governments·that demonstrate a 
capability of surviving the crisis .they confront. The commitment of 
American soldiers to any government confronted with a crisis is to be 
made only if vital interests require i.t. In fact the commitment of 
United States troops to bolster governments in Southeast Asia.is very 
unlikely in the future. The Unit~d States under this policy is reducing 
its military presence in Southeast Asia. 
The American move to reduce its military commitment in Southeast 
Asia has definitely caused considerable anxiety among.the leaders of. 
certain countries of the area which have become dependent upon the 
United States for the survival of their regimes. Thailand is among 
them. Its relationship with the United States dates back to the days.of 
Abraham Lincoln. Although troop withdrawal or a. reduced presence in 
Asia need not significantly alter .American basic interests in the 
region, it signals American intention to reduce its involvement in the 
area. and suggests a reluctance to maintain a forward position that might 
require military action. The enunciation of.the Nixon Doctrine, the 
diminishing role in Southeast Asia,. to which the Thai are most sensi-
tive, and the American negotiations with Peking, all indicate a.United 
States disengagement. The Thai leadership, of course, fears that once 
American troops.are withdrawn, the.United States may be unable or un-
willing to give direct support in an instance of Communist aggress:i.on. 
An extraordinarily complicated and delicate task of reconsidering for-
eign policy strategies confronts the Thai leaders, who fer a long time 
have been dependent upon the United States. The important question 
facing the Thai leaders now is whether recent.developments in Southeast 
4 Asia, as well as complicated political events within the cquntry, have 
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impaired the government's ability to adjust without incurring major 
sacrifices. 
When nations formulate their foreign policies, it is generally be-
lieved that they act in accordance.with whatever their national inter-
ests might dictate. The national.interests of.a nation are sa:i,.g to be 
5 the raw materials out.of which a foreign policy is made. Yet the con-
cept of "national interest" is quit:e an illusive one. It ·is not a.term 
that can be defined with definite clarity. If governmental institutions 
are stable and the governing leadership is secure, then a viable foreign 
policy reflecting vital interests is. possible. Before a foreign policy . 
!K can be determined national i.nterests must. be perceived. In the case of 
the U~i.t:~d ~;ates, the Nixon Adminis.tration .. has determined that it is no 
longer in the. interest of the Uni.ted States to play a domin.ant role in 
solving the internal problems of the .. states. in Southe~st Asia. Its 
perception of national interest. in .. the area has changed. No longer i;loes 
the Communist penetration in Sout}:ieastAsia manifest a monolithic.force. 
Instead, the Communist leaderships .. are. competing among themselves for 
position, and in the process it is conceivable that reasonably viable 
states .can, under these circumstances,.maintain themselves with a mini-
mumof assistance. Also, the.United States has determined that; even 
with an extensive commitment af .military.forces it.is difficult to sue~ 
ceec;l in problem areas where.the governing regimes are very weak and un-
stable. Internal political forces. in.the United States also h~ve_ta be 
taken into account. In this regard.theJ;'e is.con,sideraple resistance to 
long-term and extensive involvements in areas .. some distance from the 
United States. 
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Confronted with this position of the United States, the Thai lead-
ership is faced with the difficult task.of adjustmei;i.t. For a time the 
national interests of Thailand and theUnited States converged; both 
states pursued the same policies of-opposing and frustrating Communist 
moves any where in the region •.. Thailand today still considers the Com-
munists to be a threat to its nationalsecurity and well-being, but the 
United States no longer perceives the.threat.as constituting a danger to 
its vital interests. Thailand is forced to aq.just. 
This study will investigate policy alternatives open to Thailanq 
under the assumption that the United States is cl,rastically reducing its 
commitment to the region. There are four lines of policy at the present 
time that might be pu~sued by the government of Thailand in order to 
realize its national interests. Thefirst alternative is .accommodation 
with China; Thailand is. well known for .. the use of this strategy since it 
was one of its traditional policies._ Since China has always enjoyed a 
major influence in Asia and is now.developing a significant position of 
power, it is in a good position to fill anyvacuumleft by the with-
drawal.of the United States. Thesecondalternative is alignmet1t with 
the.Soviet Union, which recently has expressed some interests in the 
area and has proposed a new security arrangement designed primarily to 
check rising Chinese influence in Asia. The third alternative is neu-
tralism. This is the so-called "Thahist" independent policy presuppos-
ing absolute neutrality. It was.also.one of.Thailand's traditional 
foreign policies. However, it was discarded in the early 1950's after 
the military regime returned to.power.in.the 1947 coup. The last alter-
native is regionalism. This.would require working closely with other 
states in the Asian and Pacific region. In recent years Thailand has 
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become one of the centers of-,poli.tical .activities in Southeast Asia and 
the Pacific. Bangkok's foreign relations currently have important im-
plications for the region as a whole. __ Moreover, as a former United 
'States Ambassador t(;) Thailand puts -it, 6 Thailand has now become the 
"key link" between Northeast and South.east Asia in a growing network of 
political, economic, cultural, and military exchanges among governments, 
private organizations, and regional institutions. The efforts so far 
have enjoyed some success in terms of-social, economic, political, and 
cultural matters. Should the scheme-evolve ta include a military 
alliance, which is conceivable, it could-respond to any threat that 
might come from the powers .that -challenge_ the- status quo of the region. 
The task of foreign policy analysis is to explore the behavior of 
the state in the international .arena •.... An_ essential preliminary step in 
this task is to conceive foreign policy as a process related to a lim-
ited number of very fundamental factors. In analyzing the behavior of 
Thailand, certain factors will be taken into account. These factors, or 
the foreign policy "determinants'', will be restricted to four major 
categories in order to make the study manageable. The factors chosen 
for the study are: (1) historical factors.,..-which will be discussed in 
terms of what policy alternatives, .. based. on the past performance of 
Thailand in its response to European colonialism, Japanese colonialism, 
and Chinese involvement in the region,.are available; (2) geographical 
factors--the,influence of Thailand's-proximity.to China, the Indochinese 
area of political and military.turmoil,.and.to significant countries of 
the region i;uch as India, Aust:ralia,-and.Indonesia on Thailand's foreign 
policy; (3) economic factors--the. impact. of. Thailand's_- pattern of trade 
that might alter foreign policies of the region and the world; and 
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(4) political factors7-the relatio.nships.betweeninternal political, 
fc;,rces and foreign policy patterns, .. and .. the impact of external political. 
forces, primarily in reference to the.structure.of relationships amang 
the large power, on Thailand's fereign .. policy. 
Having identified the.poli~y alternatives available and also the 
major factors that seem to have an importantbearing on foreign policy 
choices, this study will then proceed.to .. examine the alternatives that 
these factors seem to support. 
The following hypotheses.are suggested-for.this study: (1) given 
the ideological characteristics.ef.the.Thai ruling elite and its rela-
tive stability, Thailands' past .. relationship.withChina, and the patte:i;-n 
of Thailand's international ecc;momic . relations, .. Thailand is net likely 
to align with the People's Republic .. of. China;. (2) while Th~iland may be 
more inclined te align with the Soviet.Unien than China because ef the 
nearness of China and its intense.interests in Southeast Asia, the 
ideological characteristics of the.Thai leadership, its economic inter-
ests, and the fear.of Soviet .dominance.render.alignment.with the Soviet 
Union unlikely; (3) although the Thai-leadership has previously pursued 
a policy of neutralism, which wauld.be.satisfying for a.small state like 
Thailand providing the large powers.would."leave it alone," it is not 
likely that the leadership will pursue.such .. a .. policy in the near future. 
The uncertainty of big-power relationships in.the region, the political 
instability of the surrounding.states,-and.the.threat of interqal insur..,. 
gency render this policy alternative.of.dubious value to the current. 
political leadership. Experience with.neutralism in th~ regian has not 
been beneficial to the states (such .. as .. Burma.and Laos) that have 
attempted it; and (4) the ideological characteristics of the Thai 
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leadership, the fear of Chinese and Soviet.power, the orientation of 
Thai economic development, and.the need :ior external.assistance to solve 
problems that insurgent groups benefit .. from will require the Thai lead-
ership to opt .. for regionalism as a major foreign policy position. The 
United States under the Nixon Doctrine, .. Japan because of its economic 
interests, and Australia because of security considerations, are ex-
pected to give substantial assistance.to.governments in the region which 
conscientiously and cooperatively attempt.to.solve their major domestic 
political problems. Thailand is already .. participating in such arrange-
ments as the Association of Southelilst.Asia(ASA), the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Asian and Pacific Council 
(ASPAC). 
While regionalism seems to be.the.most.logical.choice for Thailand 
in its future policy, one still.cannot be.sure that this approacl;l will 
be strong enough to contain China, which seems to have a natural affin-
ity for the area and influence in it. Thailand will have.to be flexible 
and pragmatic and not be dogmatically.boundto a single.policy pattern. 
The United States has already.indicated.a willingness to play a con-
structive role as it withdraws militarily.in.an effort to bring about 
peace to Southeast Asia. Other states, because of their economic and/or 
security interes.ts, will be involved too. 
In order to test these hypotheees,.it.will be necessary to examine 
each alternative, one at a time, and.determine.its usefulness to Thai-
land. Therefore, the chapter structure.will.be organized according to 
the alternatives. Chapter II will attempt to.present the danger of an 
accommodation policy as well as the benefits it might offer. Generally 
it will describe the impact of such.policy on internal stability and 
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progress. Chapter III will examine- the possibility of an alignment with 
the Soviet Union. The feasibility of a new security system suggested by 
the Soviet Union will be explored •. Chapter IV will discuss Thai tradi-
tional policy in reference to its. present. situation. The changing 
international environment and problem of insurgency in the region wiJ,.1 
be considered in terms of Thailand.'s national interests, Chapter V will 
attempt to assess the strength and weakness of regionalism in terms of 
Thailand's. national interests, .. Assuming that the policy of regional 
cooperation will have a real abiding value,. Thailand may be expected to 
pursue a policy of regional security •. At the same time, Thailand may be 
expected to pursue a flexible and pragmatic line of relations with China 
and North Vietnam. Chapter VI will. analyze Thailand's national inter-
ests and set forth an explanation of the policy direction that Thailand 
is embarking on with the withdrawal of the United States' military 
forces from the region. 
The nature of this task requires. an analytical and descriptive 
methodology, This study will. depend. upon limited primary sources such 
as the Press Releases.from the Permanent.Mission of Thailand to the 
United Nations,and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangkok and .f21-
lected Statements (1968-1970). of former.Foreign.Minister Thanat Khoman, 
as well as _other government publications •. In combination with the above 
primary sources, secondary sources._will. be utilized from various profes-
sional journals concerned with Asia. such.as. the Asian Survey, Pacific 
Affairs, ~.World Today, Current. History,. China Quarterly, Foreign &-
fairs, World Politics, an_d !.!!:, Eastern. Economic Review, as well as other 
newspapers and magazines such as. the.~-!£.!:l-Times, Christian Science 
Monitor,~ Magazine, the Asian Studeat, and Thailand's~ Rath Weekly. 
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The selection of the topic for.this.study·was not made at random. 
It followed, initially, from the writer!s personal acquaintance with the 
area and years of study and concern.over.,the developments that are now 
taking place in Thailand. Other.considerations make the topic well 
suited for present study. Wh~tever.happens.in Southeast Asia.in the 
1970's will have a significant impact-on.the.region and most probably 
the world as a whole. A better understanding of the politics of this 
region is, therefore, important to future.international relations. This 
study will attempt to serve thb~e purposes. 
FOOTNOTES-
1 Russell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy £!·Southeast: ~:- · 1945-,.1958 
(New York, 1958), p. xi. 
2 . ·._ 
See Richard M. Nixon, U. S. Foreie _Pc,licy for E.h!, _ 1970 's :_ :auild-
ing !2!. Peace (Washingten, D-; c7, 1971), ;>P• 10-21. · 
3Ibid. 
4 . 
Thailand is now facing the threat of ·an insurgency, an economic 
slump, and an internal political difficulty associated with the recent 
coup d'etat. 
5 -
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among-Nations (New York, 1967), p. 9. 
6 Kenneth T. Young, "Thailand and Multipolarity," Current History, 
Vol. 61, No. 3586 (December, 1971), p. 365. -
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CHAPTER II 
BAMBOOS BEND WITH THE BREEZE 
Thailand is the only Southeast.Asian.csuntry that has maintained-
its independence in the face of European and .. Asian colonial powers; 
oft~n it has been regarded as.a successful.111Qdel of small-natien dip:J_o-
1 macy. While all the other Soutl;'least.Asian states fell,into the hands 
of some European power in the nineteenth century, Thailand alone es-
caped. Thailand's experience was quite.unique. Its poliUcal, status 
during this period can be explained .. in part . by. the desire of. both. 
Britain and France to avoid confrontation.and.for a buffer state sepa-
2 rating their respective territories.(Burma, Malaya, and Indochina); and 
by the astuteness and ability of, the .. ThaL leaders in the persons of 
Kings Mongkut and Chulalongkorn •.. The story .might have. been different if 
these Thai leaders had not. dbplayed a .. remarkable. cleverness in diplo-
macy. A preferred policy strategy.of.the.past has been to seek accommo-
datian with the predominant.powers.of.the.region in.order tC? maintain 
the basic foreign policy .. objectives .of. preserving. the. geographical 
boundaries and the minimizing of.outside.interference in internal 
affairs. In the nineteenth century.Burma.was.first to resist the_ 
British and was defeated, and was.finally.annexed to the British em-. 
pire. This example of Burma served.as a lesson to its neighbor, and 
Thailand soon learned that it had.to.be.cautious in dealing with the 
Western countries. Confronted with European expansion in Southeast· 
12 
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Asia, Thailand was forced to adopt.the policy of accommodation. 
When King Mongkut came to the. throne .. in.1851; he initiated the Thai 
foreign policy of making limited.concessions.to the dominant states in 
the area. There was no point .in-resisting .. the,British because the Thai 
knew they were bound to lose. Several.commercial.treaties were signed 
between Thailand and Britain; all these treaties worked to t~e advantage 
ef the British at the expense of. Thailand ..... These. treaties provide 
extraterritorial rights for British.subjects.in Bangkok. Thailand alse 
concluded similar treaties with.other European.pewers under pressures. 
After the British came the French; in 1867~1868, Thailand made its first 
concession of land to them in Cambec;lia •.... King. Chulalengkorn, Mongkut 's. 
successor, continued this policy. of .. cencession, granting treaties and 
relinquishing territories. to. the .. neighboring. French. Empire in Indochina 
and to the.British Empire.in Malaya .. (Laos-and the .. rest.of Cambodia to 
3 France in 1873-1907; four,northern.Malay.states to.Britain in 1909). 
These.concessions weregrant~d-in an.effort.to.preserve Thlililand as a 
sovereign entity. The. Wes tern states .. were .. the'J;'eby. appeased. Failure. 
may be suggested by these acts. since-·Thailand. had to give up so much of 
its territories, but Thailand did.not .. vanish .. as.an.i11,dependent state. 
After the last concession in 1909, Thailand-reached a stage where 
Britain and France agreed to make it-a.buffer.state. No doubt a smaller 
nation has to make sacrifices under.these.circumstances; and Thailand 
did so,, but was . able ta minimize the loss .... These. events prompted 
4 Thailan4 to take steps to modernize.itself •.. A mere diplomacy ef."sur ... 
vival" was not enough;. the Thai needed .. to-bring. the ceuntry to a pesi-. 
tion of equality with Wes tern .. na ti ens , in .. orde·r - to. preserve the country's 
independence and erase the feeling ef inferiority that educated Thai 
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felt as they confronted Western skills.and.,powets. -- . Some accomplishments 
were registered.by the end of King Chulalongkorn's rule in 1910. 
Thus, this accommodating gesture .. of .. Thailand during -the nineteenth 
century, or the "bend-with-the wind'-'. approach. in foreign policy, did not 
come about without problems. Tha:l.land -- did. lose a substantial part of 
its territories to Britain and France in its effort to preserve the 
heart of the nation which constitutes the Thailand of today. Thailand 
did bend like a bamboo, but it did not break. For a while after 1910 
Thailand was able to pursue a neutralist.policy~-the first country ever 
to do so in Asia. However, when Japanese.pressures began to be felt all 
over Asia in the 1930's, Thailand bent once again like a reed in the 
wind, 
Thailand's World War II diplomacy.of cooperating with Japan and its 
accommodation with the Allied powers when the Japanese were defeated is 
often cited as proof of the cunning.and resourcefulness of its leaders. 
When the Japanese tide was rising over.all.of.Asia, the Thai government 
under the leadership of Field Marshal Pibunsongkharm envisaged a new 
role for Thailand under the Japanese umbrella.in Southeast Asia, The 
Japanese scheme of "Asia for Asians" or the '-'Asian Co-prosperity Sphere" 
was not without support in Thailand. Also, Pibun was interested in 
reimposing Thai leadership over the neighboring states. This view was 
also shared by Pibun' s arch-rival, . Pridi.Panomyong. One of the prime 
5 targets was to regain the "lost" territories.in Laos and Cambodia, and 
Thailand did so by precipitating a.war.with the French. A crisis was 
reached in 1940 over the dispute with.French.Indochina. The Thai 
government took advantage of the.fall.of.France.in.Europe to demand 
readjustments of the Thai-Indochina border. This led to a state of war 
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between France and Thailand, and.it::gave,the-Japanese·an·.excuse for in-
tervention. At the peace·conference in,TQkyo,in 1941 with Japan as the 
arbiter, France agreed to return to Thailand.territories taken in 1904 
and 1907, with the exception of the.bulk.of.Cambodia. Later Thailand 
also received from the Japanese the Shan.state (which is today a part of 
Burma) and the four northern Malay.states.lost.earlier to the British in 
payment for its war efforts. ·. Circumsta~es .. during .World War II forced 
Thailand to c9operate with the Japanese; .it.had no choice but to a~cept 
6 the Japanese demand for passage.to.Burma •.. The.Japanese.presented an 
ultimatum on December 8, 1941.to.open.the ... cCilu~try or face destruction; 
the Allies were too occupied .. to .help .. Thailat1.d ~ . Thus, Thailand cooper-
ated. Cooperation with the Japanese .eve.lved into a full partnership 
when Thailand declared war on the United States and the Allies in 
January, 1942 •. 
Cooperation witl:l Japan was beneficial.to.Thailand, which once again 
was able to evade destruction which.might-have-been brought about by war 
with the Japanese. Also, the country.remained an independent entity and 
it did recever its "lost" territories. Japanese troops, of course, were 
stationed in Thailand, but they were. there.on a "friendly pasis" and in 
partnership with Thailand and not as.occupation forces. The Thai, how-
ever, were never wholeheartedly.with.the.Japanese. Field Marshal Pibun 
reportedly made a remark to h:f.s Ch:J.ef of Staff .in 1942: ''Which side do 
you think will be defeated in this wa·r? ... Tl).at .side is our. enemy. 117 
Thus, it can be seen that Thai.foreign policy was-pragmatic and. 
quite flexible during World War II; indeed,.b.ecause.of this, Thailand 
was able to pres~rve its identity •. Thailand, .also, was prepared to ad-
just to an inevitable Allied victory. After the Bangkok government 
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declared war on the United·States·and,other Allied powers, the Thai 
delegation in Washington under Ambassador'.Seni Pramoj refused to deliver 
the declaration of war. Instead, Seni organized a "Free Thai" group 
aimed at removing the Japanese .forces in the country and asked the 
United States for support. In wartime Thailand, Pridi withdrew from the 
PibuI). Cabinet to become the Regent and principal leader of the 'IFree 
Thai" organization. 
The Free Thai- failed to established.a government-in-exile which 
could acquire recognition from the Allies, but .this did not prevent the 
post war Thai leadership from er.eating options t~at quickly resulted in 
the rehabilitation of Thailand into the,community of nations, follawing 
the war. When the government decided . to .go to war an the side of Japan 
in 1942, Pibun could do little more.to advance Thai interests than wait 
for the outcome of.the war. During.the closing days of the war the 
Pibun government could not suJ;"vive because of .the Japanese defeat. The 
man who seemed to be in the best position for leadership at this time 
was Pridi Panomyong. Pridi was able to force the resignation of Pibun 
in 1944. The·United States was sympathetic to Thailand and supported 
Pridi for the leadership in Bangkok politics. The Americans admired 
8 Pridi' s heroic role in the 1932 coup .. as .well as his leadership of the 
Free Thai underground movement inside.occupied Thailand. 9 The intimate 
contacts between the O.S.S. and the Free Thai movement, and the special 
relationship between Seni in Washingten.and.Secretary of State·Hull of 
the United States.did much to win the cooperation of-the United States 
10 at the end of the.war. In short, the United States was.willing to see 
Thailand emerge from the war on the Allied side. 
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The British were less sympatheti<;:, however. They acknowle,dged the 
Thai declaration of war and wanted to treat Thailand as a defeated en-
emy. However, with American support Thailand was. able to reconcile dif-
erences with the British. The territories gained prior to and during 
the war had to be returned. Thailand also _had to make some payments as 
a result of cooperation with Japan •. Thes.e -payme.nts, .however, were mini-
11 mal. Thailand, also, had to recognize the -Soviet Union as a price for 
being admitted into the United Nations. The laws of the Pibun regime 
' 
which discriminated against the Chinese-minority also were relaxed in 
order to appease China. These concessions enabled Thailand to maintain 
itself as a memb.er of the community of sovereign states. 
Internal politics resulted in the establishment of a civilian gov-
ernment (1944-1947). Pibun was forced to step down from the office of 
the Prime Minister by Pridi and his group. Pibun had played the role of 
the villain. Had the Japanese emerged from the war victorious, Thailand 
would have been victorious with them. As it happened, the Japanese lost 
but the Thai did not. Pibun was soon.permitted .to go free without con-
spiratorial charges being brought against him, and he retired privately 
to his home in Bangkok. By 1948, however, .he was in power again. In 
the meantime, Pridi was indeed the .'!hero" .of -Thailand. Yet he declined 
an offer for the position of Prime Minister. Kn;o:wing that if he was. to 
be Prime Min_ister, the people would expect .the .impossible out of him as 
the nation was experiencing some hardships .resulting from the war-torn 
economy. Thailand's.success after thewar was at least in part due to 
the United States, whose postwar policy in -Southeast Asia at·the time 
favored the emergence of free and independent .nations rather than the 
12 re-institution of colonial empires. 
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After Pridi's interlude (1944-1941) during which time Thai foreign 
policy can be described of neutralist, Pibun led Thailand to the United 
States' side. To a certain extent it .could be described as.another 
"bend-with-the wind." United States power was replacing that of the 
British and the French in the area. Domestically, however, Pibun needed 
the support of the United States for his.leadership. In his second 
comeback as Prime Minister his power was not as strong as it was before 
the war. The 1947 coup that brought down.the.civilian governme~t under 
Pridi13 was staged by a group in the army .composed of junior officers. 
These men were not competent enough to .form their own regime. After two 
brief interim governments, Pibun was .invited .to return to office. But 
this time he was dependent on forces.other than his own. The government 
virtually was run by three men; it became known as the triumvirate 
regime. General Phao Sriyanond of the.police.force and General Sarit 
Thanarat of the army were two of the men who enjoyed substantial power. 
Pibun, who had nothing but a popular name, was. caught between the two. 
To secure his position, Pibun had to play one against the other, and at 
the same time develop popular support. He did so by getting the United 
States to publicly recognize his leadership •.. Incidentally, it was the 
time that the "Cold War" between the United States and the Communist 
countries had already set in. The United .States thus found Pibun's 
nationalistic sentiments and anti-Communist .outlooks compatible with 
American foreign policy objectives in-Southeast Asia. 14 The United 
States even refused to grant Pridi, the man whom it admired earlier, 
political asylum and he went to China •.... In .effect, the United States was 
supporting the man who during World War II was.its enemy, for a leader-
ship role in Thailand. Because of this support, Pibun was able.to 
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maintain his position for about tienyears. During this period Thailand 
allied itself·closely with the West, and particularly with the United 
States. It abandoned its original policy of caution and limited conces-
sions, and gambled on a dependent relationship with the United States. 
Pibun's successors, also, have followed this policy even though other 
powerful forces have been active in the region. 
A quicl,c. look at these. historical. events . revelitlS that there has been 
a rather consistent.pattern of behavior in Thailand's response to the, 
international environment. The ''bend-,with-,the wind" approach is widely 
recognized as a viable policy by leading Thai foreign policy strategists. 
Mention must be made, however, that each time the "bend-with-the wind" 
was,adopted, Thailand generally followed a neutralist pattern. As it 
may be seen in the periods prior to accommodation with France and 
Britain, and from 1910 to 1939, prior to the Japanese invasion, and dur-
ing Pridi's interlude (1944-1947), Thailand's foreign policy was of.a 
15 neutralist stance. Generally speaking, then, it was only when 
Thailand ran out of options that the government resorted to the "bend-
with-the wind" tactic. The differences can be detected in the Pibun era 
after .World War II, however. The bending .. toward the United States 
appeased domestic forces.on behalf of Pibun and he used this tactic;: of 
dependence on the United States asa measure to ensure his own survival. 
It was.not that Thailand had run out.of options in foreign policy. The 
situation in the 1950 1 s.was quite different from that of the 1860's.and 
the early 1940's in which, had Thailand refused, serious consequences 
might have followed. 
Observers of the contemporary scene.are .speculating that Thailand 
will seek a rapprochement with China and the Soviet Union when the 
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United States withdraws from the region •... An. accommodation policy of 
this nature is not unique; several states .today, such as Finland, 
Cambodia (under Sihanouk), and, to a .les.ser .extent, Burma, are employing 
it. While the present changes in Thai-United.States relationship are 
not likely.to bring about.a complete .tenµnation of the alliance, 
Thailand does confront a growing Chinese influence and must consider 
accommodating it. The recent visit .of .Pi::esiden.t .Nixon to Peking indi- . 
cates that Washington has acknowledged .. that .no lasting solution to 
Southeast Asian international problems,.(.spec-ifically, the Vietnam war) 
can be derivecl witli.out.China's cooperation. Tli.us, in the event that the 
United States should leave the region, .China, in. competition with the 
Soviet Union, will attempt to fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of. 
the United States. The political wind .is.shifting; undeniably the.up-
coming wind is that of China or the Soviet Union. 
Traditionally, China has always maintained a superior status.vis-
a-vis Thailand. The Thai liveq. in .southern.China before migrating south-
ward to the Il)dochina area. About.the.seventh century (A.D.) the Thai 
created in Unnan (southern China). a powerful .kingdom known as Nan Chao 
(some 500,000 Thai still live there).; they challenged Chinese_supremacy 
for more. than one h1,mdred years before .. making .peace with China. The:y 
accepted vassal status-in the ninth .century. •. Thereafter, a steady flow 
of-Thai moved southward in order to escape.Chinese power. The founders 
of the Thai kingdom set up capitals at. Sukothai .(1238-1350), Ayutthaya 
(1350-1767), and finally at Bangkok (from.1767 .onward). These kingdoms, 
too, f9und it necessary to normalize their .. relations with China. Fear-
ful of their big and powerful neighbor, a.pattern was seon set.for trib-
utary missions to China from the beginning of Sukothai to about 1853. 
21 
This was done at fairly regular in.tervals--,,averaging one-mission every 
ten or twenty years. These tributes-were.acknowledgment that China was· 
culturally and politically influential- .over ·Thailand. But it would be 
wrong to regard this relationship as a pr.ecedent for a satellite system. 
The tributes ceased in 1853 after the. Thai .learned that China was itself 
falling prey to .the European powers. 
Past-relationships with China brought abou.t,commercial exchanges 
and cultural influences. In order to maintain a friendly relationship 
with China, the Thai had to accept Chinese .. migrants. whose purpose. for 
coming into Thailand was mainly ti;-ade. Within Thailand t~day. the 
Chinese make up about 10 percent of the total population, and almost 50 
16 percent of .the population of Bangkok. . The Chinese have been fairly 
well assimilated. Because of their.economic vi8or and caiilmercial capa-
bility, they have gained a position of great economic and financial 
power within the country~ While the .assimilated Chinese in Thailand may 
not think in terms of loyalty to. their. mo.ther country. yet, they cons ti-
tute a major concern for the Thai leadership •. Obviously, with signifi-
cant elements of this economically powerful minority characterized by. 
ties with and pride in the culture .of their. tradi~ional homeland, there .. 
are serious possibilities of subversian .•... This was one of the .major 
factors that was ·used to justify the coup of November 17, 1971 which re-
st,1lted in the abolition of the _Parliament-, the Cabinet, the Constitution, 
and the imposition of martial law. Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, 
the leader of the coup, j ust.ified the actions. by this statement: 
We are not .certain how many of them [Chinese] sympathize with 
China, now that Peking is.in a position to exert powerful in-
fluence all over the world [having been admitted to the United 
Nations]. If _a lot of them do, then the possibility that they 
can assist the Communist.terrorists cannot be ruled out •••• 17 
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Since the United States seems determined to lessen its role·in. 
Indochina, the Thai leaders.obviously believe that they must.be prepared 
to adjust their polic:f,.es to the changing.situation. Thailand, of 
course, could bend toward China in. order. to .. appease it. There. are coun-
tries in Southeast-Asia which have done that. Cambodia, under.Sihanouk, 
was,one of thetn. Yet the Cambodian .case.was.different from that of the 
Thai. The Cambodians resorted to this tactic.not because China was an 
immediate threat to thetn. In fact,. China might not have an interest in 
direct expansion into Cambodia. Cambodia was face to face with its 
traditional foes, with Thailand on the.one side and the two Vietnmµs on 
the other. Its more,immediate external problems derived from these 
countries rather than China. Sihanouk could not count on Western.back-
ing to meet .threats from Thailand and South Vietnam. Besides, the United 
States made it clear in the Manila Protocol (SEATO) that its obligations 
18 were lim:f,.ted to instances of Communist aggression. Sihanouk undoubt-
edly believed that he must seek other sources of countervailing power to 
meet the renewed threats from these traditional foes, and China was 
quick to promise assistance. Thus, he .initiated a policy of balance, 
whereby the forces of one camp in the .. Cold .. War might check the forces of 
the other. He evidently was hoping that .Peking would exercis~ a mea-
sure of restraint over North Vietnam .and .. provide a guarantee against 
attack fr<:>m Thailand and South .Vietnam ... At the same time, he planned to 
maintain a neutralist attitude to.ward the United States, hoping that the 
United S~ate~, too, would exercise -the .same. kind of. restraint over its , 
allies, Thailand a~d South Vietnam. 19 . 
As for Thailand, China has made it public that it is its next tar-
get for bringing about a revolutionary change. Ever since the Communists 
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came to power in China in 1949, there has.been nothing but open antago-
nism toward the Thai government. For example, the government of Field 
Marshal Pibunsongkharm was variously styled during this perfod as· 
"criminal", "fascist", and "lackey of WalLStreet 11 • 20 In the mid-1960's 
the increasingly harsh tone of China's propaganda attacks on Thailand, 
including Foreign Minister Chen Yi' s o.ff-,,hand remark to a visiting 
Westerner tha1;: "we hope to have a guerrilla warfare going in Thailand 
21 beforethe year (1965] is out", highlightec;l a major threat to the Thai 
government. Full-scale guerrilla warfare has yet to develop, but there. 
have been sporadic.terrorist activities ever since. 
The Thai leaders are now looking for a peaceful way to solve this 
problem. Their efforts started with the. announcement of President 
Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968. This 
was perhaps an indication to the Thai leadership that the common inter-
ests of.Thailand and the United States in.resisting the Communists no. 
longer existed and that the Thai government could no longer implicitly 
rely upon American power. Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman took the 
initiative in making overtures to China. He announced in a Tokyo televi-
sion broadcast in February, 1969, that Thailand.was.considering a Thai-
Chi d . l 22 nese ia ague. This took the other.Cabinet members and even his 
closest sul?ordinates by surprise. Ina.way,. it was seen as one step to-
ward a possible detente between Thailand.and China. It was Thanat's 
view that a small country could not afford to wait and face trouble when 
it comes, but must go to the source and try to meet the contingencies 
23 which may arise. However, Peking officially ignored this overture. 
The military members of the Cabinet, including Minister of Economic 
Affairs, Boonchana Attakorn, were known to disagree strongly with Dr. 
Thanat. 
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While in Bangkok in the summer of 1971, the writer had an opportu-
nity to talk to some military officers ,and.,.public ·officials concerning 
a possible change in.relations with China. Most of them expressed 
opinions that they saw nothing wrong in -a rapprochement with China. In 
fact, they indicated that thie might prove to be a plausible way to ease 
or improve racial relations.within the country, as well as lessen the 
probability of Chinese-inspired subversion against Thailand. After all, 
those assimilated Chinese who now live in Thailand plan to stay in 
Thailand. When they make profits in their commercial activities they 
invest their money back in the Thai economy. They do not send their 
profits back to their home country as .do the Japanese. Between the 
Chinese and the Japanese, the Thai are .inclined to have more favorable 
attitudes toward the former. At the present time 35 percent of 
Thailand's foreign trade is with Japan. 24 Already the Thai are com-
plaining about "unfair business practicesll imposed by the Japanese. 25 
Furthermore, Thailand's deficit.in the balance of trade with Japan is 
now very big. For example, from a negligible deficit of $5.1 million in 
1955, Thailand's deficit trade with that country rose to $138.9 million 
by 1965, and to a gigantic.$416.8 million by 1970. 26 At the moment, 
Thailand has yet to establish a regular trade pattern with China. Only 
in November, 1971, the ban on trade with China was lifted. By normal-
izing relations with China, it is hoped that the Chinese.in Thailand 
will feel more secure about their status.and thus will be willing to 
contribute more.to the growth of the Thai economy. 
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In view of Japan's increasing influence in Asia, there is a possi-
bility of a Thai-Japanese aliiance. The Japanese, however, have.not 
significantly developed their .military power since World War II. The 
Thai could not count on the Japanese in.case of a Chinese attack unless 
Japan d.ecides .· to rearm. Another .country that might play a role as. a 
counteryailing power to china .is .India. India, however, has been pre-
occupied with its relations.with.Pakistan. The Indian armed forces seem 
to be capable of defending India.against Pakistan, but under present 
circumstances India is hardly able to play a major power role in South-
east Asia. Actually, in terms of.the limited military power of India 
and Japan, Thailand does not have many options. Also, if the Soviet 
Union does not want to get involved in Southeast Asia, the result is 
that China must be dealt with without an offset by Japan or Indian or 
the Soviet Union. 
Foreign Minister Thanat and his Deputy, the Prime Minister's broth-
er, are known to have seen Pridi, the .Thai senior statesman who has 
lived in China almost continuously.since 1949. 27 The meeting was under-
stood to be private, but it .has.been speculated that the Foreign 
Minister was exploring the .improvement of relations with China through 
28 Pridi as an intermediai:y. . The.details of the meeting were not made 
public. The·Thai government ha$ .constantly denied that the meeting be-
tween Pridi and .the Foreign Minister was.of a political nature. 
The year 1971 marks significantly the beginning of a.trend to 
change Thailand's relations.with .China. Thailand cannot unnecessarily 
alienate China. Evidence of the ,new orientation is found in the.reluc-
tance of Thailand to enter the Cambodian conflict after Colonel Lon Nol 
took over the government in Phnom Phen. Some military members of the 
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29 Thai government were known .to support ,intervention. Nevertheless, 
Foreign Minister Thanat's position.prevailed. Also, there was an offi-
cial silence on Thailand's par.tin.the American-supported South Vietna-
mese.incursian into Laas. 30 Prior to this invasion, Laos was regarded 
by the Thai leadership as having .a str.ategic impartance tQ Thailand's 
security. 31 Communist dominance in Laos was viewed as being detrimental 
to Thailand's security. Thus, .. a softening of. a previously hard-line 
policy was evolving. Thailand .in the .past voted with the United States 
on the issue of seating the .People's Republic of China in the United 
Nations. More recently it .adopted .a.two-,China policy in the United 
Nations, and finally .abstained fr.om. the voting when the issue was voted 
on in the General Assembly in 1971. 
Throughout 1971 and until the coup in November, Bangkok kept saying 
that it would welcome open discussions with Peking on "any" subject. 
Moreover, a permanent task force was established in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to study.the possibility of ending the ban on trade with 
China. From time to time ther.ewerereports that Thanat claimed there 
had been some favorable responses from China and that prospect for a 
32 dialogue had developed. The Thai government ordered a halt in its 
radio attacks, on Peking, and China.,. in return, was beginning to reduce 
33 aid to the insurgents inside .Thailand. . . After the November coup, how-
ever, Dr. Thanat and all other .Cabinet members were austed. The coup, 
however, did not appear to deter the path to a new approach in Thai"."' 
Chinese relations, even though it w:as understood that the Chinese 
minority in Thailand was causing.some internal problems. Government. 
stability was.not threatened.because of Chinese relatians alone. The 
more important problems included a conflict between the government and 
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the Parliament over the national budget., a discovered "plat" by some 
MP's to vote no-confidence in the government, and lastly, increasingly 
strong. arguments with Dr, Thanat '.s .foreign policy within the Cabinet, 34 
With regard to Dr, Thanat's China palicy, however, the ruling National 
35 Executive Council.(NEC) finally decided, after cansiderable considera-
36 tions, to lift the ban on trade.with China. Since.the ousting of 
Foreign Minister Thanat, the NEC has yet to repudiate the initiatives 
with respect to China taken by Dr. Thanat. It is possible, however, 
that Dr, Thanat might rejoin the _.Cabinet ance the NEC decides to form 
one in the near .future, 
Internal politic~! events within Thailand at the moment are confus-
ing, The dangers and uncertainty in which Thailand now finds itself re-
sembles the circumstances.of nearly .a century ago, when the natian was 
threatened by Great Britain and France, Today Thailand is being threat-
ened, at least by words, by China and, to a lesser extent, North Vietnam, 
Thailand's past performance suggests that once the nation is seriously 
threatened, it usually resort~ to .accommodation with the power that is 
threatening it, However, accommodation in the past was largely the re-
sult of a "force majeure", or, in other words, when Thailand had to 
choose between destruction.or survival, In the nineteenth century, the 
French and, during World War II, the.Japanese sailed into Bangkok harbor 
and delivered their ultimatums ... Thailand .complied, At present time, 
the threat to Thailand from China. is serious but limited, For many 
years it most likely will be confined to infiltration and subversive 
operations. Large-scale overt aggression from China is discouraged by a 
modest industrial capacity, a meager transportation system, a lack of 
certain strategic minerals, a rugged, inhospitable terrain, and the 
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37 enormous.retaliatory power of the United States. The Peking regime 
has often voiced bitter ideological threats and has promised a revolu-
tion in Thailand; yet in practice it has followed a·more·cautious·policy 
of.psychological warfare and has not engaged in bold acts.of direct 
aggression. 
One other significant difference between the present situation and 
Thailand's flexible diplomacy in earlier periods.lies in the interaction 
between foreign policy and domestic politics. As stated earlier, the 
alliance with the United States harmonized with the.domestic consicl.era-
tions.of the ruling elite and servecl to strengthen its internal posi-
tion, especially during thePibunera .. It may be recalled that Pfl?un, 
at that time, needed United States support for his leadership. Since 
World War II the United States.has continued to support the military 
governments. Rapprochement.with a Communist country, on the other hand., 
is expected to have, at best, no impact and, at worst, limited negative 
effects on the internal position of the present elite. The larger and. 
the nearer the Communist country. is, and the closer the relationships 
with it, the more adverse the perceived consequences, It is doubtful, 
if relationships between the two countries were to be forged, that China 
would tolerate the military regime of Thailand. Some .. scholars in 
Thailand do not believe that a long~time enemy such as China could 
really be an ally .of.Thailand. 38 In order to really "appease" China, 
the military elite perhaps may have to go. This is an almost impossible 
condition, at least for the. time being. 
The military leadership.of.Thailand, past and present; has been 
known for its nationalistic.sentiments.against the Chinese minority 
within the country. For more than forty years the Chinese community 
has been.a source of fear and anxiety to and an object of pressure and 
39 regulation from the Thai government.and the ruling class. Since the 
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agvent of the Communist regime in China, the attitude toward China rests 
in part on the official assumption. that militant internal dissidence in 
Thailand is supported by Peking. It is recalled that a "Thai Autonomous 
People's,Government" was established in southern China in 1953 as a for-
mal government in exile, 40 and that the Thai Patriotic Front broadcasts 
periodically from there and in 1965 designated Thailand as.the next 
country to be liberated. 41 Furthermore, the Thai have had a traditional 
42 fear for China. Most.Thai today, even.though propaganqa has undoubt-
edly exaggerated Chinese power and ambition, still believe that the 
Chinese.are setting out to do exactly what they have said. 
The average Thai citizen also has.a deep fear of Communism. It .is· 
generally believed that if Communism were ta prevail in Thailand, the 
twe pillars of the.Thai society.,..-Buddhism and Monarchy.,..-.would be de-
stroyed. These basic beliefs are taught in. schools, and the government 
discourages.the attempt to discuss Communism in depth or analytically. 
Thus, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to change these beliefs. 
Since China turned Communist, Thai fear has increased. It would indeed 
require some,long.,..range modifications of the political structu1;e as a 
whole. Not only the military leadership.will have to revise its basic 
assUlllption concerning China, the attitudes of the people must also be. 
changed if China is to be accepted as an ally of-Thailand. 
Nevertheless, an accommodation policy with China has not been with-
out support in Thailand. S . l 43 ome circ es in Thailand contend that per-
haps China is seeking a status quo situation in Sout}:ieast Asia. They 
believe that China is not interested in expansion, but only in th~ 
removal of foreign troops and -b.ases .•. ;.·When ·this is.-realized relation..-
ships between the two countries·can·impr.eve. '!'his cantention seems·to 
be consistent with Chinese Communists' .·behavior since 1950 which., when 
carefully analyzed, reveals a cautious·· and. pragmatic ,stance on foreig11 
poli~y issues. 44 · Some ·American .. analysts -argue ·that ·China's policy is 
essentially defensive and.in reality is a reactien ot the provocations 
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45 · of other-powers, including the United States. China is seen as will ... 
ing to live in peace with the Southeast.Asian natiens that go not asse ... 
46 ciate themselves closely with tqe United. States. Assuming the cor .... 
rectness of this line of reasoning.,.China,. of ceurse, has reasQns tQ act. 
with hostility against Thailand •. Thailand does have American air.and 
naval.bases and soldiers.on its soil. At the same time Thailand refuses. 
to recognize the People's Republic of China, but does maintain-cordial 
47 relations with Taipei. These. are. the. factors that must be reckoned 
with when one considers China's behavior.toward.Thailand. Under these 
circumstances.if foreign bases and. soldiers.are removed, an accoilllllQda ... 
tion with China.may be expected- to.preduce.a satisfactory.outcome. 
Similarly, Thailand could strike. a .. deal with the Nerth Vietnamese, 
but Thailand probably has less .. to fear from North Vietnam t:han China. 
Also, if acco1'llllodation with China is.reacQed, Thailand may expect China 
to exercise a measure.of restraint against. the North Vietnamese. It 
should be pointed out that Thailand has already had a dialogue with 
North Vietnam concerning the repatriation of 40,000 North Vietnamese 
refugees in Thailand. During the. recent.meeting of the representatives 
of the two_cc;;,untries in Bangkok., .. the head.of.the Vietnamese delegation 
insisted on "the age..-old friendship. between. the Vietnamese and Thai 
peoples.'' Thailand in return promised to recall the 12, 000 Thai troops 
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48 in South Vietnam. This indicates.a further softening of Thailand's 
hard line against the Asian Communist states. 
While the above thesis concerning.Chinese behavior seems plausible, 
the lessons learned from other. countries.' relations with China have pro-
duced concern and fear. Other Southeast Asian countries, such as Burma 
and Cambodia; have tried hard to avoid provoking China. Yet, in mid-
1967 Peking began to call for the complete. overthrqw of the Ne Win 
government of Burma. Cambodia.also.experienced the same difficulty, 
49 although not directly from China. In. fact, Sihanouk's accolJlI!lodation 
policy toward China and North Vietnamproved to be the major cause for 
his own downfall. In maintaining this policy, Sihanouk had to provide 
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese. troops sanctuaries for their 
operations in South Vietna~. This. had been going on for more than five 
years. Not only the Viet Cong and. th~ North Vietnamese were given an 
easy access to Saigon, they at times. turned. against the host country and 
50 gave Sihanouk some internal problems1- .. The Cambodian military was dis-
pleased with such developments. They finally staged a coup against 
Sihanouk. 
Indonesia was another Southeast.Asian country that experienced sim-
ilar difficulty in dealing with China. Indonesia for a short while swung 
to China's side and, consequently, an. abortive Communist coup supported 
by China was staged against the government in 1965. It was suppressed 
by the military and the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) was demol-
ished. Given these experiences, the. Thai government would probably be 
very hesitant to work closely with the Chinese. One should not forget 
that China is the traditional great power of the region with a long his-
tory of influence. Southeast Asia has been viewed by both the 
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Nationalist and Communist ·Chinese.·alike.•as part ·of ·the tradi:tional 
Chinese."Middle Kingdoui,." Therefore.,.a.design·of territorial aggrand-
izement should net be ruled o.ut .•.. An accommodation pelicy might facili-
tate rather than prevent Chinese .. expansion. into Thailand. 
There is no doubt that China is behind the internal insurgency in 
Thailand. While there is some evidence. that th~ "poo-kawgan.rai~" or 
the so-called Communist ter];'.orists, are people who,are striking at the 
maladministration of the provincial governments rather than making a~ 
51 effort to establish a Communist. system., . the. Thai government usually 
ter~s these dissidents "Communists." Most of.· Thailand's secial problems. 
result from conflicts with minority peoples., economic hards.hips, and 
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poer social conditions. In the.northeast it ,is.the Laotian minority; 
in the north tl'!,e hilltribe or the. ''Meo"; and. in. the south it is the 
Malay/Muslim minority. The .welbintegr.ated part of. the country, the· 
central plain, does not experience.major. difficultie~. The Communist 
leadership has been taking advantage of the .. discontent in these minority . 
areas. The situation can be improved if,the Thai government would solve 
the.real problems. During recent years. an.effort has been made·to im-
prove the economic and social .conditions. in. these rem~te a:i;-eas. Mili-
tary suppression can.be a temporary selution at best. The issues caus-. 
ing the conflicts m4st be c;lealt with if long-term stability is•· to be. 
realized. 
An accemmodation with China is no.t. likely to satisfy the present. 
military. leadership of Thailand •.. As. stated earlier, the impact on the 
internal position of_the .elite .may be in. the.negative. China itself 
probably. is not willing to tolerate. a. r.egime. that. has. been strongly. 
anti-Communist and nationalistic . as Thailand's.· ruling regimes have been. 
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Also, this policy would tend to aliena.te.other Southeast Asian states 
against Thailand. We may recall that- Cambodia felt this pressures when 
it switched to the pseudo-neutralist. position, proclaiming China as its 
"great friend." Should Thailand go.with. China, it would imply that 
other lines of policy would be closed,. especially that aimed at regional 
cooperation, of which Thailand has been the prime exponent since the 
early 1960's. 
Thailand has now opened its.trade.door.wit}:i. China, but the extent 
of trade to be established .is not.yet. known •. As. far as Thailand is con~ 
cerned, however, the government.f.oresees. no.possibility of-opening 
53 politic1,Jl connnunicaticm between the. two. countrie$. Even. in trade, t~e 
potential is limited. For,example,former Minister of Economic.Affairs 
Booncbana Attakom stated that.Th1,Jiland has few. connnodities tq.e Chinese 
54 need. China itself is .not. yet an .. industrialized nation. Peking 
already duplicates the primary producer. economy of Thailand, and Bangkok 
is unable to supply China's industrial needs •. Therefore, the two econ-
omies are mutally exclusive. Nevertheless, there is an area w~ere the 
two economies seem to dovetail, and that is .. rubber. The sluggish Thai 
rubber market coincides neatly with. the.seemingly insatiable demands of. 
the burgeoning Chinese tire industry •. So far,. however, the Chinese 
rubber needs are very well met by. Malaysia.. Furthermore, the Thai 
government has announced that. it·would. trade with China only on a,basis 
more favorable to Thailand. than. China... In other words, Thailand would 
55 import less than it exported to. Ch:J;na ..... As.of this date very little 
has m1,Jterialized. This will.not significantly promote the major economic 
policy objective that could lead to a political rapprochement wit}:i. China. 
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Thailand's economic development is. closely tied to the United 
States, The spectacular rate of economic growth of about 11.8 percent 
per year during 1966-1968 can be explained in part as a result of the 
United States military spending in Southeast Asia. 56 Already the econ-
omy is facing a slump as the United States reduces .its aid and withdraws 
militarily from the region, 57 China evidently is not in the position to 
help Thailand in its economic. development., .. In the .. economic realm it 
does not seem likely that Thailand would be forced to orient itself to-
ward China. 
From the preceding analysis and. despite some tempting historical. 
analogies and Thailand's present behavior. toward China, it would seem 
that the possibility for accommodation.with China is quite limited. 
There is no doubt that the Thai government is re-assessing the relation-
ship between external events and national. security. Concerning the 
present trend of relations, toward. China-, the writer is inclined to think 
that it.should be interpreted. to be.no more than the general desire to 
change basic policies, and perhaps.a.warning. to.the United States that 
it should not withdraw from the region •.. Thailand in the past has dis-
played a "flexible" diplomacy; perhaps. it.is. time now to do it again, 
However, this is still far from going "all the way" with China. The. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is still- unable. to monopolize the country's 
foreign policy. As noted,.powerfulmilitary leaders.were highly dis-
pleased with Dr, Thanat's move;and it is. they.who wield power and make 
decisions for Thailand. In any case,. successful.adoption of this policy 
of accommodation requires more. than just. Thailand's interest. There 
must be some degree of. interest from. the larger power in seeking such a 
relationship and at present there is little interest shown by China, 
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Thailand itself has yet to face a "force.majeure" or the situation where 
there is a clear lack of choice. And. lastly, there must also be a de-
gree of harmony between domestic.political. considerations and foreign 
policy, For the last reason alone,.the adverse effects on.the internal 
political structure are probably more than the benefits that this policy 
would bring. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ENEMY OF AN ENEMY IS A FRIEND 
Discussions concerning Southeast.Asia.and the major powers often 
focus on the extent of United States and.Communist Chinese involvement 
in the area without the same attention being given to the activities of 
the Soviet Union, Yet there are clear indications that the Soviet Union 
has a continuing and growing interest in Southeast Asia, While Soviet 
interests can be traced back to the first years of the Russian Revolu-
1 tion, intensive activity in Southeast Asia began in 1955, Moscow at 
this time abandoned its hostility toward unaligned nations such as 
India, Egypt, and Indonesia. Southeast Asia, until 1955, did not en-
gage Moscow's attentions as persistently as Western Europe; the nature 
of Soviet activity depended much upon. local. conditions, When local con-
ditions can be exploited, Russian activity became apparent. With the 
advent of the Khrushchev leadership,.however,.Russian interest in South-
east.Asia became more decisive. This becomes.evident as one studies the 
development of the Laotian crisis of. 1962. 2 Toward the end of 
Khrushchev's rule, however, Russian.interest waned considerably. The 
growing difficulties with China forced.Soviet poli<;:y-makers to reap-
praise their attitudes, The intensification of the war in Vietnam since 
1964, 3 Soviet trade with the more prosperous economies of Southeast 
4 Asia, particularly with Singapore and.Malaysia, the increasing impor-
tance of the Indian Ocean to the Soviet space effort and to Soviet naval 
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5 powe; in Asia, and the struggle for.leadership of the national libera-. 
. 6 tion movements in the developingai::eas.as.a.whole, suggest the in"'." 
creasingly important position South and Southeast Asia occupied in 
Soviet thinking after 1955. It seems.that-the-Soviet attitude to and 
relations with the area have-assumed.a far.greater urgency in.recent 
years. Although the Russ_ians already. participate in the Economic Com-. 
mission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE} .. under the auspices of the. 
7 United Nations, the region has never acquired the same priority i~ 
Soviet policies toward the third world as has the Middle East which, be-
cause of its proximity to the Soviet Union,. plays an important role in 
Soviet foreign policy. 
Contemporary Soviet foreign policy.in Southeast Asia seems to have 
four prime aims. First of -all, the .Soviet Unic;m favors. stability in the 
area and the establishment of a.suitable.climate. in which to pursue what 
it. terms its "policy of peaceful ca .... exis.tence!' and ta extend its .polit-
ical·and economic influence fui::ther. Vis~a~vis the Chinese, the Rus-
sions have more to gain by promot.ing .. stability than by fomenting 
revolution, which would redound to .Peking.'.s .. benefits. Th:f,s can be s~en 
in the decision of the Indonesian government in 1966 to end its cqn-
h:-ontation policy with Malaysia. The .sovie.t reaction was favorable and, 
consequently, improvement in Soviet-relations with both ~laysia and 
Singapore became possible. Secondly, and.directly linked to the first 
point, the Soviet Union seeks to limit American and other Western inter-
ests, without at the same time damaging .. ii::reparably its rapprochem~nt 
with the United States.- Thirdly, the, Saviet. Union sees itself as the. 
leader af the Afro-Asian liberation struggle. and is .. anxious to disprove 
the Chinese accusations-that Soviet "revisionism" is working hand in 
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glove with American "imperialism." . Finally and of increasing impor-
tance, there is the desire to contain and replace Chinese influence by 
Soviet influence, not only in Southeast Asia, but in the third world as 
8 a whole. 
It is the last aim that has really turned Soviet attention toward 
Southeast Asia. The extension of Chinese influence,.particularly as.it 
was manifested in such a potentially wealthy )ind strategically important 
state as Indonesia (under Sukarno), and the gradual expansion of Chinese. 
influence in wars of nationa.:J_ liberation-in other Southeast Asian states 
such as South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand pose a serious 
threat to Soviet interests. The prospect that the whole revolutionary 
movement will come under Peking's hegemony is regarded as a real dan-
9 ger. Furthermore, the Russians and.Chinese are themselves traditional 
enemies. Even today there are.border.territories that China and the· 
Soviet Union dispute. Also, Chinese aggressiveness in recent border· 
clashes suggests tho\l,t Peking is recuperating.from the turmoil of the 
Cultural Revolution and that Chinese leadership is in a position to 
speak authoritatively in terms of power.vis-a~vis Moscow. Thus, a 
direct threat to the security of.the.Soviet.Union is involved. Without 
doubt the Russians have been trying to find a way to curb rising Chinese 
influence and power. 
Granting the above interests, the course of international relations 
between the Soviet Union and one of.the moreviable countries in South-
east Asia--Thailand--becomes a matter of importance. For the first time 
since World War II it seems that the interests of.the two countries are 
converging. This development suggests a second alternative for 
Thailand, which also views China as a major threat. 
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Historically, Thailand once looked to. Czarist Russia for protection 
against European colonialism which.was.creeping in around it in the 
10 nineteenth century. The relations .. of. the two countries developed be-,, 
cause of.the personal friendship between. the two monarchs, King 
Chulalongkorn and Czar Nicholas II. 11 King.Chulalongkorn in his clever 
tactics in dealing with the European. imperialists asked for Russian 
assistance in preventing the continuing.encroachments by France in Indo-
china. Czar Nicholas was interested in extending help, but.his effort 
was.not successful. Yet, the relationships of.the two countries contin-
ued to be warm. A number of young.Siamese.noblemen, including one of 
12 Chulalongkorn's own sens, were sent to.Russia to study. Some were.to 
remain.in Russia and serve in the Imperial.armed forces. The warm rela-
tions continued until, 1917, the year. of.the. Russian Revolution. 
With the rise of Lenin and the Bolsheviks., relationships between 
Thailand and Russia were severed •. The older.Thai generation still re-
calls their abhorrence of the 1917Russian Revolution, and more partic-
ularly the massacre of the Czar and.his. family by the Communists. These 
historical-traditional sentiments. were superimposed on anti-Communist 
beliefs. Communism was then seen as the. antithesis to Buddhism and the 
Monarchy, the two pillars of Thai society .• 13 The new Soviet government 
displayed little or no interest in Thailand in. terms of developing dip-
lomatic relations. However, scholarly circles in the Soviet Union con-
tinued to reflect an interest in the political developments of the 
country. This interest focused upon.the.1932 Revolution in Thailand, 
the role of Pridi Panomyong, and.a very.far.,-sighted concern with the 
growing influence of Japan in the area in the 1930's. 14 
44 
The Russians regarded · the.·Thai. Revolution,. perhaps accurately, as 
having no significant impact upon the.political power structure of the 
Thai society. To them, Thailand was.still . ."one of the most character-
istic kingdoms.in the Orient;" the.so.,...called coup d'etat of 1932 had not 
15 alterE!d the status of the Siamese king.as the "absolute ruler." 
Pridi, who was regarded by many within Thailand at the time as a Commu-
nist, was brought.to trial because of.his !'Communistic" economic propos-
als of.1933, which were almost an exact copy of the Soviet constitution. 
He did not receive much attention from.the. Soviet leaders, however. 
Pridi was treated sympathetically, but not as a Comm1,mist. The Soviet 
government at no time indicated an interest in the resumption of diplo-
ma tic relations. Perhaps in the 1930.' s. conditions in Thailand were in 
no way conducive to the expansion of Soviet.ideological influence. 
Soviet leaders did become concerned.over the.increasing role of Japan in 
Southeast Asia in general and Thailand in.particular during the 1930's. 16 
Because of Thailand's strategic location.vis,-a,-vis British Malaya, 
British Burma, and French Indochina, it. could.serve as a valuable spring-
board for Japanese expansion. In this respect the importance of 
Thailand was recognized. 
Political developments during the. early stages of.World War II re-
quired some changes in Soviet strategies •. France capitulated to Nazi 
Germany in 1940. This represented a.direct threat to the security of 
the Soviet Union even though it hadanon,-aggression pact with Germany. 
In an effort to secure itself against.a.possible invasion from the East 
while its Western borders were threatened,. the Soviet Union decided to 
17 improve its relations with Japan •. Soviet.relations with Japan inevi-
tably involved Thailand, which was already working with the Japanese. 
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The Soviet Union adopted a neutral .. p.osi.t.ion.on.the Thai-Indochinese war 
(with France), and established diplomatic-relations with Thailand on 
18 March 12, 1941. During the early-part.of.the.1940's Thailand gener'"'." 
ally followed the. example of Japan.,. the self.,..professed. Asian leader in 
the Pacific; this policy was dictated by.the Gavermnent of Field Marshal 
Pibun Songkharm. As the fortunes of Japan in. the Pacific began ta wane, 
Pibun was forced out of office. The civilian govermnent.that took.over 
felt. less canstrained t.o follow the. Japanese, course. In 1945, the 
Soviet Union undertook hostilities toward Japan, but its attitude toward 
19 Thailand was unclear. 
Pibun wa1;1 forced out of power .. toward. the. end. of 1944, and Pridi 
assumed the reins af power in Thailand .. - , .Shortly. after com.ing to power 
as Prime Minister on March 24, 1946, .. Pridi. cautiausly opened the ques.,. 
tion of reestablishing diplomatic relations.with. the Soviet Union. 
During a press conference in May he• said:· 
Politics and diplomacy are. two- entirely. different.· things. 
Whether we agree with another.' s beliefs. has. noth;J.ng to do 
with diplomatic relations •... I wish ta insist. that. Siam can 
never be a Cemmunist -country, .. because. our ... customs, conven-
tions, and history differ.greatly.from.that of Russia. Be-
fore.the Soviet Revolution.peasants an4 the.poorer class.in 
Europe were tools of.the.landowners-.and.capitalists •. The 
hardships which these people.hadte, suffer-gave,rise.to 
Communism.. I have studied. enough. economics to. be in a 
position to say 'that Communism.can.never.happe1;1.in.this 
country and that we havenothingto.fearabout.that. I 
wish to make .. this point clear because I was once branded a 
20 . . Communist ••.• 
Perhaps Pridi's accession to.power.was.an.event favoring the re-
S1,1ID.pt:J.on of relations with the Soviet.Union ... Itshouli;l be nQted, how-
evef, that although relations.had.been.formally.reestablished in 1941, 
they did not in reality.materialize.during. or- immediately after the war. 
Thailand's most pressing problem after the Japanese defeat was to regain 
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the status of an honorable member of the .. community of. nations at1d to re-
store its prestige with the Allied Powers with whom it had, at least 
21 formally, been at war. In order toreali.zethis objective Thailand 
sought admission to the United Nations Organization, and ill this re-. 
spect, Soviet cooperation was badly. needed, Finally, the Soviet Union 
agreed to support Thailand, Yet, more than a year was to elapse before 
a diplomatic exchange actually occurred, . Fo.r the most part the Soviet 
Union displayed marked indifference toward Thailand. Probably, the most. 
important explanation for the Soviet Union's willingness to.reestablish 
relations with Thailand was commerce. 22 . Yet commercial interc;ourse be~ 
tween the two countries has been statistically insignificant. 
With Marshal Pibun back as Prime Minister ,for. the second time in 
1948, difficulties in the relations between Thailand and the Soviet 
Union once again developed. The Pibun regime,. committed to the United 
States, was no longer sympathetic.to. the Soviet Union and the commercial 
venture collapsed, It was found out that the Soviets were using the 
23 embassy in Bangkok as an important propaganda center, In 1952, Soviet 
publications were banned, 24 and during. the same year there.were rumors 
that the Thai government was threatened by a. Soviet mastered plot, 25 
Relations between the two countries deteriorated, The Soviet Union's 
denunciation of Thailand as a puppet of Washington has been a regular 
the.me, By the end of 1960, as the Laotian. c.ri.sis deepened and the 
Soviet Union supported the leftist forces with an airlift from Hanoi, 
reconciliation between the two countries became even more unlikely. In 
May, 1962, United States tr<;>ops were. dis.patchec;l to Thailand to prevent 
any spill-over from Laos. This was congruent. with the Ru$k-Thanat Com~ 
munique of March in which the United States pledged to defend Thailand 
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bilaterally without.waiting for "prior.agreement" from other SEATO mem-
26 hers. Later, as the United States. intensified its war efforts in 
Vietnam through the use of .American air bases in Thailand, Thai-Soviet 
relations continued to cool. Actions .. by. the Thai government against 
Soviet espionage activities and the continued surveillance of Soviet 
personnel in Thailand revealed the tense relations.between the two coun-
tries during the 1960's. 
The changes in .American foreign policy as expressed in the Nixon 
Doctrine, however, forced the Thai leadership to reappraise its position 
toward the Soviet Union. The phasing down .. of United States involvement 
in Vietnam, and statements by .American leaders about·a reduced military 
presence in Soutl:ieast Asia suggested the.need .for change in Thai foreign 
policy. On top of these developments came.the British announcement of 
their intention to withdraw from "East of the Suez" (meaning primarily 
Singapore) by 1971. 27 Simultaneously,. the Soviet leadership indicated 
28 an increased interest in Asia, . In Sou.th Asia particularly there.has 
been an intensification of Soviet economic and.diplomatic activity, 
which is reflected in several high-level visits to the area by Soviet 
statesmen, Kosygin visited Afghanistan., India, and Pakistan in the 
spring of 1969 and went back to India again in September en route to 
attenq the funeral of Ho-Chi Minh. Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Defense 
Minister, went to India and Pakistc1,n in. March of 1969, and a Soviet 
29 delegation visited Afghanistan in July.of . .the same year. 
Apart from these well-publicized tou:rs,by Soviet leaders, other 
Soviet off:j.cials·also have visited Southeast Asia, The Soviet Trade 
Minister, for example, visitedMalaysia, Cambodia, and Singapore in 
March, 1969. It was understood that the visit to Kuala Lumpur was to 
negotiate Soviet credits and technical -aid, and the ·visit.· to Singapore 
was to promote commercial as well as diplomatic relations. 30 In addi-
tion, M. Kapitsa, Head of the Southeast.Asia Department of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry, visited Laos and Thailand.. Thailand also welcomed a 
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Soviet c~ltural delegation in June of 1969. An economic and technical. 
mission was sent to Indonesia to discuss economic cooperation, espe-
cially the completion of Soviet aid projects and the difficult.question 
of Indonesian debt payments~ Finally, it should be noted that a cul-
tural delegation and Pravda's Tokyo correspondent, Biruyakov, visited 
the Philippinel:j. Soviet leadership is interested in opening diplomatic 
31 relations with that country. 
Speaking of Soviet activities in As.ia .in a television interview in 
Bangkok following President. Nixon.' s visit .to Th~iland, the Foreign 
Minister, Thanat Khoman, hinted that Thailand might pursue a more inde-
pendent foreign policy. A proposed trade.agreement with the Soviet 
Union was the subject of renewec). talks in .. 1969 (it had been discussed 
off and on for ten years). Similarly., considering the .present Soviet 
interests·inSoutheast Asia, Dr. Thanat.told an American audience at the 
University of Minnesota in November, 1969: 
If you avoid a tiger [China] and come [face] to face with a 
crocodile [the Soviet Union], it is not much of a change •••• 
If we do not have any other.alternatives, maybe we will have 
to live with the crocodile.... This is exactly the inter-
national pattern that may emerge if and when.the United 
States has to yield to the press~re of completely withdrawing 
. 32 from this part of the world •••• 
Also, in his address to the Asian Society in New York in early 1970, 
Dr. Thanat reiterated a possible Thai independence foreign policy, in-
.. · 33 
eluding the possibility of alignment with the Soviet Union. 
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It should be recalled that earlie.r in .. June ·of 1969 at th~ Communist 
Summit Conference held in Moscow the most spectacular development was 
Chairman Brezhnev's call for a mutual. defense pact against Chinese ex-
pansionism and "imperialism." The split between China and the Soviet 
Union has long been known. The dispute.between them has become so seri-
ous that the Soviet Union has decided to contain China."militarily." 
Soviet policies thus have shifted fr.om the passive. plane of ideological 
contest, occasionally sharpened by border clashes, to more active meas-,. 
ures to contain Chinese activities as reflected in the proposed security 
arrangement for Asia. In justifying the -Soviet position, Communist 
Party Chairman Brezhnev explained: 
Peking's practical activity on. the, international scene con-
vinces us increasingly that China.'s .foreigp.. policy has, in 
effect, departed from proletarian.internationalism and shed 
its socialist class. content. That is the .. only possible 
explanation for the persistent efforts to identify the 
Soviet Union .with U •. S •. imperialism. What is more, the 
spearhead of-Peking's foreign policy.at the present time is 
aimed chiefly ~gainst.the Soviet Union and other socialist 
34 · countries. • .• • . . . 
Thus, it would seem that the Soviet. Union has come to the conclu-
sion that the Sino-Soviet dispute is no longer a product of personal 
animosities or ideological differences, but has reached the level of 
national frictions.with important national interests at stake which war-
rant concrete measures for their protection. Since the primary Soviet 
objective seems to be to prevent China '.s. achievement of dominant in-
fluence in Southeast Asia, any Thai attempt .. to improve relations with 
the Soviet Union could be interpr.eted .as. recognition of a mutual polit-
!cal.interest to contain China. Inany.case,Moscow probably intended, 
by reference to a security arrangement., to signal to the independent 
nations of.Southeast Asia that the Soviet Union has interests that are 
50 
compatible with their interests. Thailand. ·-officially received the 
Brezhnev proposal for a security pact.,. but it has yet: to show anything 
more.than a polite interest in the Sovi~t.proposal for an Asian security 
system. However, the Soviet leadership has left: the sch~e largely un-. 
defined. Asian reactions to the scheme have.varied from lukewarm inter.,. 
35 est to outright objection. It was.understood that Br~zhnev was 
speaking of "collective efforts. o.f all .. s.t.a.tes of Asia and of the globe 
in their common interests" with details to be discussed at a later 
36 date. In early 1970, however, Moscow stated.that the proposal had no 
"military overtures~" It was presen.ted .. as .. a .kind .of non-aggressien pact 
to "unite all the peace-leving forces. in Southeast Asia!••• [It is to 
constitute] a unity of forces not for .war but to.preserve peace~ 1137 
Moscow thus confused the Asian nations even .mo.re. Consequently, the 
world has still no clear understanding of.what the Soviet Union has in 
mind. 
Thailand has been skeptical of multi~national security systems be-
cause .of its experience with SEATO ... SEATO.has not lived up to Thai ex-
pectations and for the most part it has .proved to be a-total failure. 
Foreign Minister.Thanat has frequently expressed his government's belief 
38 t:ha:t: military pacts are "obsolete." The history of Thai commitment to 
security system~ indicates a marked decline .. in their .attractiveness. 
Rather, the. interests of Thailand have .been .. b.etter served through bilat-. 
eral political guarantees by Great P..owers .. (such .as the Rusk-Thanat Com-
munique ef .1962) or informal greupings (regio.nal understandings) of 
like-minded smaller states that can assert stronger press'l;lre during 
crises tl)an any single.member. Nevertgeless, Thailand.has adopted a 
"wait.and see" attitude en the.matter. At the same time Thailand has 
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made cautious diplomatic moves toward the Soviet Union. Past Thai-
Soviet relationships have not been smooth, but this does not mean that 
future relationships will not be productive. In fact, cultural ex-
changes between the two countries have Qeen taking place more frequently 
39 since 1966 than before. 
From the economic standpoint Thailand.has recognized the importance 
of trading with the Soviet Union and .Eastern European countries. This 
was reflected in part during 1969 when there was .an interest in ccmclud-
ing technical agreements with the Soviet Union. Trade agreements with 
Bulgaria and Romania were signed in March, .19.69. In December, 1970, 
after a long period of discussion, a. trade.agreement with the Soviet 
U i . d 40 non was signe. However, Thai. trade with.the Soviet Union and 
Eastern European countries has been quite -small, representing less than 
41 one percent of the total Thai exports, and the.potential for expansion 
is quite limited. The Soviet Union and the Eastern European states.are 
not likely to provide Thailand with a substitute for the Japanese mar-
ket, which has been Thailand's -principal market for the last twenty 
years. Such trade will not significantly promote the major econemic 
policy objective of diversifying trade.and.reducing Thai dependence on 
Japan, and it-should not significantly .alter Thai foreign policy in such 
a way that one could claim that an orientation toward European Communist 
countries is emerging. 
Specifically, what does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish by its 
direct approach to the Southeast. Asian governments in reference to secu-
rity? Is _the proposed security system necessary or.feasible? Whatever 
the Soviet Union may have in mind, it is clear that the prime purpose of 
Brezhnev's proposal is to win Asian sentiment to the Soviet side, both 
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as a weapon in the Sino-Soviet dispute and .in Soviet efforts to erode· 
Am i ' fl ' A' 42 er can in uence in sia. The Sino~Soviet dispute is bound to dis-
tort the view that the Soviet-American .. rivalry exists in the Middle East 
and Indochina. In effect the Soviet Union,. by reference to the new 
security system, is bringing its own Cold.War .with both the United 
States and China into the Asian region... It seems that the Soviet Union, 
like the othe~ Western powers, may be defending .only its interests 
rather than providing any real measure.of,mutual benefit to the other 
states involved. The prevailing mood .among the Asian nations, tempered 
by the.experience of .the existing pacts involving Asians and the turmoil 
in Vietnam, indicates a strong reluctance to accept similar responsibil-
ities and possible liabilities inherent in joining coalitions sponsored 
by Great Powers,-
Moscow is in a considerably stronger position vis-.a-vis Inclia than 
other Asian countries. Since Mrs. Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister, 
she has steadily developed close links with Moscow. The relations be-
tween the two countries since 1965 Indo,-.Pakistani War have been very 
cordial; economic collaboration has. been.the, th~me of the day. The 
Soviet Union has built a second steelworks, has .provided 300 million 
raubles in credit for the fourth Indian economic plan and in December, 
1970 signed a cammercial treaty with India.,43 . At the same time, mili-
tary collaboration has been intensified. The Soviet Union has supplied 
armaments, aircrafts, warships, and submarines to India. 44 Economic and 
military collaboration betwe~n India and the Soviet Union finally re~ 
sulted in the signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Coopera-
45 tion in August, 1971. 
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It was not apparent in 1969 that India was prepared to accept the. 
Russian security scheme without reservations. At the time, the way that 
the Indian government saw it was. that the Russians were more interested 
in economic cooperation, ·to which India was not averse, than in a mili-
11 . 46 tary.a 1.ance. The official position, .. repeatedly asserted by Mrs. 
Gandhi, was that in India's opinion no vacuum.will follow American and 
British pull-outs from Asia and, should one arise, the.cauntries of the 
47 region themselves would fill it •.. The situatien is much different to-
day since India has moved even closer to Moscow •. Although. the treaty of 
August, 1971, might not commit India to .a fo.rmal o.r automatic military 
alliance with the Soviet Union, there is no doubt that the Soviet Unien 
is in a better position to impose its infJ,uence on India. India might. 
not be as free to pursue its own policy of nonalignment even though the 
48 Soviet Union has.recognized itin the treaty. 
There were some indications, however, that the treaty has not met 
49 with full approval in India. To some, the Indo-Soviet treaty will 
antagonize China, and might very well mark a new Cold War in this part 
50 of the.world with India in the eye of the storm. The Indo-Soviet 
friendship pact, though long in preparation,. is mainly.intended as a 
51 countermc;,ve to American and Chinese ."p.ing,-,pong" diplomacy. The signs 
of .a Sino-American thaw have caused some concern in Moscow and thµs the 
Soviet leadership decided to offset it by signing a treaty with India. 
Whatever the.case may be, it is clear .that Moscow has successfully con-
solidated its position in South Aeiia .• 
When the Soviet Union first announced its plan for a new security 
system, Pakistan's epposition to it was.very.precise. There wasne> 
likelih0od at the time (and even now) of its joining an anti-China 
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alliance. Yet, recently the Soviet Union has supported a,summit meeting 
52 between India and Pakistan. Pending. the.upcoming summit, it seems 
clear that the scope of Soviet interE!,sts.inciude an attempt to reconcile 
Indo-Pakistani differences. , Without. the two potential powers 0f the 
region, the Soviet scheme probably would not work. At the present time 
it does not appear that India and Pakistan.will fully cooperate~ This 
would render the task of prote~ting the region aaainst Chinese moves 
more difficult. 
The Soviet Union has also made some.significant inroads inte South-
east Asia. Recently it has attempted to promote,diplomatic a1;1.d trade 
relations with Singapore and Malaysia. When.the Russians announced 
their plan, Malaysia seemed interested. 53 _The.proposal was well in line 
with Malaysia's quest for a three-power. guarantee for the neutralization 
54 of Southeast.Asia. But the Russians have taken the idea no further. 
Nevertheless, relations between the two countries are slowly developing. 
In Singapore, however, the situation is different. The small Republic 
does not seem to carry enough international weight to make it a major 
target of Soviet interests even though trade between the two countries 
is flourishing. On the other hand Soviet relations with Indonesia have 
significantly improved. Their.differences on debt payments have been 
1 d d h R i h d d 'd I. d · 55 sett e an t e ues ans ave agree to. ex.t.en more. ai to n onesia. 
Among the Southeast Asian countries,. Thailand is probably the country 
where Soviet activities are least in evidence .• 
On a bilateral basis, Moscow's.campaign areund Asia already.is be-
ginning to pay off. Today there is remarkably. less hostility on the 
part of Asian nations toward the Russians. than a few years ago. This is 
probably what the Russians wanted to do any way when they talked of a 
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"new Asian security system." Yet, there. 1$ less Soviet interest in 
Thailand than in other countries. For. p.r.actical purposes, it is deubt-
ful that.the Soviet Uniqn regards. Thailand. as a particul~rly valuable 
ally in its clispute with China. Larger.,. mare prestigious ,Asian nations. 
(e.g., India; Pakbtan, Indonesia) would probably rate higher in 
Moscow' s,,priorities. 
At the pres~nt time discussions concerning. an Asian security system 
have subsided, since the Soviet Unio.n. has acceI11plished a great: · delitl 
without it already. It is -true that. Mo.a.cow pr.abably has the pewer and 
means tQ undertake such a far-reaching. engag.ement. in.Asia, but it is 
doubtful that Moscow is willing to assume the °Qurdens,of such a commit-
ment. Moreover, the Soviet scheme actually gr.ew ou.t,of the Soviet 
Union's desire for greater cooperation with. its southern neighbors. 
During his tqur of South Asia, Kosygin on. more .. than one occasion 
stressed the importance of increasing. cooperation. between India, Paki-
56 stan, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Soviet:. Unien.. This behavior of the 
Soviet leadership suggests that Southeast.Asia may not be as important 
as South A1;1ia in the Soviet Union's _list of pr.iorities. 
In reality, for an Asian security system .. to be. successful, it could 
hardly exclude China. Without. China.,. as. the. United States has discov-
ered, no genuine peace and stability. in.Asia. can evolve. It has been 
suggested that the Soviet Union .. would. not ·be .. averse to. China's eventual 
participat:ion in. the proposed system and,. in fact, has invited China te 
join it. 57 Bllt if China does, perhaps it.would mean that China and the 
Soviet Union weuld have resolved their.more.impertant differences. The· 
scheme then would lose its vitality, since. it is.based upon the premise 
that China .is the menace to peace in Asia. Sheuld the two erase their 
differences, the threat of co-domination. by both China-and the Soviet 
Union in Asia is imminently increased. 
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Whatever the case may be, most Southeast Asian governments today 
have recognized the.dangers that too close an association with a ll!ajor 
power can entail. This is the reason.why.many Asian countries were hes-
itant to accept Br~zhnev's offer at the beginning, Thailand has fully 
committed itself to the position of the United States, and is new can-
fronted with some difficult problems because the.United States has de-
cided ta withdraw from the region. A clase association with a majar 
power toe often results in a loss of.autonomy over internatianal and 
dome~tic.affairs. An undesirable dependency upon the major power is 
difficult to avoid. The Soviet Union is, of .course, capable of doing 
what the United States has done in resisting China's penetration into 
Southeast Asia, but is is not likelythat Thailand wauld folfow the same 
road it has t+avelled before, 
On a bilateral basis, nevertheless,. it seems tha1; there is a 
greater possibility af Thailand becoming aligned with the Soviet Union 
rather than through the s~curity. system. pr.oposed by the Soviet Unicm. 
From the domestic point of view, alignment with the Soviet Union on this 
basis would seem to have a less damaging impact on the intedial position 
of the present military leadership even. though there are ideological 
differences. The Soviet Union is much further away than China and h~s 
little or no connection with the insurgency movement currently in prog-
ress in Thailand, As far as insurgency is. cancerned, the present ruling 
elite is less antagonistic toward the Soviet Union than it is toward 
China and North Vietnam. 58 Yet the question r.emains: if Thailand were 
to align itself with the Soviet Union, would the latter be prepared to 
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effer the Thai government assistance against. Communist revolutienaries 
within the country? The Soviet Union .c.ur:rently is. not in a position to 
restrain the major Communist parties. in Southeast Asia wp.ich are in 
rebelli<;>n against·th~ established governm~ts. 
Whether or not Thailand decides to. align. itself with the Soviet 
Union depends to a.large extent on external factors, At the present 
time a feeling of real urgency and. crisis on. the part of Thailand does 
not exist. The fighting in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam has yet to 
expand into Thai territories. Thus., the. incentive to seek alternative 
alliances or active acconunodation with outside powers is.accordingly re-
duced. More<;>ver, the possil>ilities of restructuring foreign policy are 
limited by the interests of the large powers. At the present time the. 
Soviet Union has not shown much interest in Thailand. The Thai leac;ler-
ship may acconunodate itself to the interests of the Soviet Union, but 
this is unlikely. In recent years the military leadership has shown its 
strong opposition to any attempt to make a lldeal" with Communist states. 
Of course, there is a desire for more .. flexib.ility in foreign affairs, 
but this is limited both by the lack of external options and by domestic 
restraints. 
In the final analysis, the Soviet Union.' s presence in Asia has pro-
vided Thailand with another alternative. As far as the proposed Asian 
security system is concerned, it seems. that the. prop0sal has been 
treated as a diplomatic reality rather than all shadow and no substance. 
The diplomatic aspect of it hG!,s already paid off., for tl;ie Soviet Union; 
the Russians now have more friends than ever in Asia. On Thailand's·. 
part, there is an awareness that changing patterns of internatienal 
relations are emerging in Southeast Asia; but as far as Thai relations 
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with the Soviet Union are concerned, the..dev.elopments.are as yet embry .... 
onic and contain more questions than certainties. It is ·daubtf\11 that 
Thailand will be led in the Soviet.direction. Yet, it is a possibility 
that cannot be.ruled out. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE POLICY OF ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST 
''Why should we inherit the hatreds of others? It is bad enough 
that we have our own burdens. 111 The~e words a,f Mr. Nehru's convey the 
essence of the policy that has come te be known as "nonalignment.'' Many 
of the newer and less.powerful states opted for a foreign policy of non-
alignment as the two major powers--the United States and the Soviet 
Union--competed for position in the international arena.after World 
War II. They were suspicious of. the former colonial powers including 
the United States and they were not sure that their national interests 
2 could be served by an alliance with the Soviet Union. The two Great 
Powers became entangled in conflicts and tense situations in all conti-
nents. The United States and the Sovi~t Unfon continue to compete.in 
the world environment today. However, it appears that neither side can 
completely win against the other. This reflects. the peculiar condition 
of a world in which two major powers.,vigorously compete while at the 
same time they try to avoid a direct confrontation that might lead ta a 
holocal,ls t. This _ is the s0-called "Cald War • " To some Asian leaders, 
such as Mr. Nehru, the Cold War is basically a big-power problem. Yet, 
the countries of Southeast Asia have been caugµt in the middle of.the 
conflict and have paid a high price for .it.. The United States, the 
leader of the.so-called "Free World" camp, has tended to see Southeast 
Asia as the frontline in the struggle against Coi:µmunist Chinese 
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"aggression" and "subversion," while the Chinese have viewed the con-
tinuing Western armed presence as an overt threat to th1;3ir security and 
as the final desperate effort of "imperialism'' and "n;eo-colonialism" to 
subjugate the region.· Both sides have exerted various kinds of.pres-
sures in the pursuit of their ends, A number of the states of the 
region in an attempt to protect themselves have espoused "nonalign-
3 ment. 11 . 
Today, nonalignment is simply the name.u,ed to describe the foreign 
policy of any government which tries to preserve its independence and 
secure its internal stability without adhering to a military bloc or re-
lying upon armed intervention by one of. the major powers during time of 
4 crisis. It is simply an effort to "opt. out'' of direct involvement in 
the major powe:r struggle, a refusal to "stand .up and be counted" for 
either camp. 5 At the same time this attitude. reflects aspirations.to-
ward the greatest measure of independence, .. not only in international re-
lations, but in internal affairs. 6 Nonalignment is of two types. The 
first type which the writer prefers to call "negative nonalignment" is 
that foreign policy of a state which completely isolates itself from the· 
outside world, The state which espouses such a foreign policy usually 
refrains from taking an active part in international affairs. The terms 
"nee-isolationism" or neutralism might very well describe such behavior. 
Examples of states in this category include the United States in the-
7 1800's .and present day Burma. On the other hand, "positive nonalign-
ment" is that foreign policy of a state.sq.ch as India which continues to 
take an active interest in world politics but wants no part of the 
"Great-Power struggles," The state that .. espouses. "positive nonalign-
ment" (or what India calls "positive neutralism") is anxious te trade 
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with everyone, including the Great Powers. It welcomes-grants, loans, 
technical, economic anci military.aid from.both of them, but with,out any 
"strings" attached, Nonalignment, therefore" should not be confused 
with the concept of neutralism. It has certain "positive" aspects in an 
8 . 
effort to promote peace and to preventwar" whereas.neutralism is the 
condition of a state at peace and not actively involved in international 
9 affairs. A state is forced to accept the condition ef neutralism 
eithe1; because of its own restraints such as traditicm and geographical. 
10 locations or by the other powers. .States enjoying a neutral status 
must be recognized as neutral by the large powers, Experience from the 
past indicates that this status is not.self..,,executing, If a power de-
cides te violate the neutrality of another state, other powers in the 
region can be expected to do the same. Neutrality, thus, does not 
suitably describe the policies of contemporary small states who are non-
aligned but do respond to the big power..,,rivalry in terms of their 
national interest, Nonalignment has been.popular with a number of the 
new states. It reflects an attempt on. the part of the new states to 
maintain an independent status vis,-a,-vis all other states, particularly 
the former colonial powers, 
Initially, nonalignment was not accepted by the United States or 
the Soviet _Union. Stalin and John Foster Dulles, the late Secretary of 
State of the United States, both attacked the nonaligned countries. 
Over a period of time, however, the attitude.of the two Great Pewers 
toward nonalignment (sometimes known as. ''positive neutrality" or "neu-
tralism") was modified. Under the leadership of Khrushchev, the Soviet 
Union advocated a policy of peacefuLco-oexistence, and with it the 
Soviet Union attitude toward Asian nonalignment changed. Massive Soviet 
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aid to India and Indonesia.was an indication of the revised position. 
Even though Dulles was antagonistic toward .. nonalignment, the United 
States began under his Secretaryship .. to respond to the nenaligned states. 
Also, the People's Republic of China.has tolerated the nonalignment of 
the Asian states. Especially in the .. mid,-1950 's, during the so-called 
Bandung period, China adopted a much moremoder~teand flexible strategy 
aiming at the promotion of friendly relations with a wide variety of 
C i . 11 non- ommun st countries. Since China.is nowmoving towal;"d a more 
cooperative position in its relationship.with the United States, the 
Southeast Asian states, especially thoseallied with the United States, 
are encouraged to adopt a more flexible.position toward China. In the 
light of the performance of certain nonaligned states (such as India) in 
the area, this presents the Thai leadership.with another alternative in 
planning its foreign policy. strategy •.. Disillusioned with the failure of 
military pacts, the Thai government does.not seem interested in an 
alternative military pact or in revitalizing the existing one with the 
12 United States. This being the case, .nonalignment is another possibil-
ity open to the Thai government as it responds to changes in the inter-
national environment. 
Historically, Thailand, like other Asian.states, was suspicious of 
European motives and recognized the.dangers of.European expansion into 
Asia. Yet it could not avoid contacts with the.West. The first cantact 
between Thailand and the West occurred in 1518, and the first Eurapean 
nation ever to set foot on Thai soil was Portugal. The main purpose of 
the Portuguese was trade, and they were.given generous commercial and 
trading facilities in Ayutthaya, the capital .. of the Kingdom at that 
tim~. Other European nations included the British, represented through 
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the East India Company, and the Dutch •. They·were given the same·privi-
leges as the Portuguese. In .addition, .. these. Western nations were alse 
permitted to establish Christian missions ... in. Thailand. Dutch influence 
grew se rapidly that they gained a large ... measure.ef central over the 
ecenomy. Because of this, the British.f.ound. it. unprofitable t.o continue 
their .. trade in Thailand. Dutch. influence ... penetrated varbus levels of 
Thai life; on one occasion. they .even .ass.isted ... the. Thai King (Prasart. 
Thong) in his accession to the throt\e.by promising.him support.against 
13 his enemies. Later on when another.King.(Narai) came to the throne, 
he found that Dutch influence was se extensive that he decided to curb 
it by attempting to align the country.w.ith.other.Eurepean natiens. 
First, he turned to th~ British .and tried-to.conclude an agreement wit~ 
them which would provide military assistance in case of hostilities with 
the Dutch. Great Britain, however, was-interested only in obtaining 
long-term trade concessions, and the.East India Company was.induced to 
reopen its factory in Ayutthaya. The King.then turned to France, and 
through his Greek adviser, Constantine Phoulkon~.Thailand was able te 
get a letter from Louis XIV that hinted .. at.the .. possibility of an alli-
ance between France and Thailand against .. the. Dutch. However, France 
appeared to have been interested far.less in .. aiding.the Thai against the-
14 Dutch than in turning Thailand into a.Christian.Kingdom. In 1664, 
French missionaries were given permission to establish a church and a 
seminary and to extend their werk .. to other .. parts .. of the Kingdom. They 
were also trying, but in vain, to. convert. King. Narai to Catholicism. 
This caused a great deal ef resentment.am!;lng Thai.noblemen, and eventu-
ally they planned to rid Thailand of.Western.influence through a "coup 
d'etat". As the King became fatally ill in 1688, these Thai 
"nationalists" carried out their plan and.the first "coup d'etat" 
occurred in Thailand. 15 Subsequently, a new King came to the throne, 
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and the French and all other Foreigners.were.driven out af the country. 
Thus, in seeking trade and alliance with.Western powers, the Thai ended 
up with foreign intrigue in the internal.affairs of the state. For the 
next one hundred and thirty years.the.succeeding.governments for all 
16 practical purposes shut out the Europeans •....... 
Thus, Thailand had practically isalated. itself. from Wes tern .. con-
tacts.and influences. This.resulted.from.suspicion directed at the 
Westerners, a legacy of the periad after .. 1688.. . Also, the Thai govern-
ment felt na compelling need to trade.with the West .. 17 After the King-
dom was established at Bangkok, it .. became one. of .. the most powerful 
states in Southeast Asia. Its position.was,threatened, however, by the 
steady advance af the British into Malaya andBurma as well as by the 
French encroachments into Indochina ....... Once. more. the country was forced 
to open its door to Westerners and several commercial treaties were con-
eluded with them. In 1851, relations with the.West were at a critical 
juncture. The British had now gained.control of.the Malay states up to 
the area of Thai influence. Therewasa.possibility that they might use 
force to accomplish their objectives in Thailand .... With the ascensicm of 
King Mongkut to the throne, the.independence.of.the country was_pre-
18 
served by making concessions to . the .. encroaching. Western powers. 
Thailand's success.in.maintaining.its.independence amidst the en-
croachments of the imperialist.powers during this period can be attri-
buted to a combination of several factors: ... the. clever and opportt,mistic 
diplomacy of their leaders, Thailand '.s. :relative. isolation from the major 
centers of European penetration in Southeast Asia, and the mutual 
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agreement by the British and the French.to.permit Thailand to serve as a 
19 buffer state. The latter factor was.the.most important. The fact 
that Thailand was located between Britain's and France's spheres of in-
fluence provided Thailand with a unique.opportunity to survive as a sov-
ereign state. The Thai tried to establish.close.relations with both 
France and Britain in the 1850'sandthe.1880's respectively, with the 
hope that France would counteract the growing.economic and political 
20 influence of Great Britain and vice versa.. These attempts were of no 
avail because neither imperialistpower reciprocated. Neither was will-
ing to defend Thai interests at the.risk.of.bringing.on a war with the 
21 other. Because the two imperialist.powers. feared. the consequences of 
common borders, a guarantee of the integrity. of Thailand as a buffer be-
tween the two was agreed to in 1896. Thailand's independence conse-
quently was preserved. 
Because of its geographical location.and. the.fact that Western 
powers had no interest in forging.an.alliance with it, Thailand was 
forced to adopt a policy of neutralism.toward.the external powers. The 
United States, the only country .that maintained. a sympatheti.c attitude 
toward Thailand throughout this difficult.period, was not interested 
h h 1 d ' d k 1 ' i 22 enoug to e pan instea too a neutra .posit on. In the meantime, 
Thailand was confronted with the problems of.internal modernization and 
administrative reorganization •. Recognizing. that administrative weak-
nesses and internal disorder encouraged.imperialist. intervention as in 
and Vietnam, 23 TheThaileadership.was.confrontedwith the difficult 
task of political development •. The.period.prior. to.World War I was one 
of internal modernization and administrative reorganization. 24 By 1910, 
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reforms had been undertaken throughout.the.administratien; and numerous 
25 changes conf rented the old bureaucr.ats.. . . . ... 
Thailand also struggled to rid itself.of the infringements on its 
sovereignty which various·European.powers had. imposed during the nine-
teenth century. Mostly 1 these. took. the .. form. of extraterrit:erial rights 
imposed by the Europeans. However., prier. ta.World War I and alse during 
the interwar periad, "the traditiona!.foreign.poli~y ef Siiµll., 11 states 
Sir Josiah Cresby, a British.Minister.for.the Far East, "has been ane of 
26 studied neutrality." When Werld.War. I- broke. out., Thailand declared 
its neutrality. Great Britain and.F.rance.were. anxieus to h~ve it join 
the Allies, becauf;ie of. the large. quantities. ef .. food. it. could contribute 
and becat,ise both Allied powers.ceuld, then withdraw troops from Southeast 
Asia to be used at the. Western front .• 2?., Most. Thai. tended to be sympa-
thetic teward the Germans, since.they had.never infringed on Thai sev-
ereignty. The Germans had. been goad .. traders. and had assisted Thailand 
with its internal development,.notably in.building. its railroads. By 
1917, however, it was clear that the-Allies would win--particularly 
after . the United S·tates declared. war on Germany. and Austria. King 
Wachirawut, who ascended the tl).rone. in 1910.and.was sympathetic to 
Britain as a result of _ lc;mg schooling. in that country, found th~ tim~ 
opportune to join.the Allies. His.primary.ebjectives were te gain 
international recognition for Thailand.' s. independence. and. its heundaries 
and.to regain full-contrel over the.foreign nationals living within its 
borders. Thailand then declared.war.against.Germany on the pretext ef 
its unrest:ricted submarine warfare •.. The. outcome.of,the war did Thailand 
much good; it enabled Thail~nd toaccomplish .. both objectives. Aft:er t:he-
war, Thailand earned the right both.to be.represented as an equal at the 
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Paris Peace Conference and to participate.a1:1. a charter member in the 
League of.Nations. Its international status. had improved enormously 
over what it had been a decac;le earlier,. .. and .. the stage was- set for nego-
tiations ,with the European nations .to. termiu.ate the ext+aterritorial 
rights and "special privileges''- provisions of those treaties concluded 
in the_l850's and the 1860's. 
The period after.World-War. I., however.,.witnessed-Thailand retu;-ning 
to a neutralist policy •. King Wachirawut.cont.inued.his father's palicies 
of modernizing Thailand, centralizing.government-control, and preserving 
the monarchy. In addition, he introduced- the- important Western concept 
of _ nationalism into the Thai. political .. environment... He was a fervent 
propagandist for Thai nationalism •.. Throughout,his. reign Thai politics 
focused on the activities of forging. the.beliefs and symbols.of Thai 
nationalism. The King even introduced .. anti,-,Chinese sentiments into the 
political environment. It ha~ been argued by a Thai writer that from 
this point in time the Thai and the .Chinese.became. antagonistic toward 
28 one another. Great sums of m(;)ney.were.spent.onelaborate functions 
and royal tours for the _ glorification .. of Thai. nationalism. Wachirawut, 
also, carried on his father's policy of.social. reforms. The whole coui;,.-
try was._preoccupied with internal developments. and. natienal il!].age build-
ing. Thai forei.gn policy remained .. neut+alist-- in orientat~on. 
Domestic_ consider~tions dictated .. the .. continuation af this policy 
after the deat:h of King Wachirawut in. 1925 .. and. until , the Japanese inva-
sion of Southe~st Asia. Wachirawut's.successor,. King Prachatipok faced 
a, serious deficit in_ the national budge'!:- as. ·a result of his brother's 
extravagance and lavish spending. The.national.economy.also suffered 
because of the world economic depresston (;)f the 1930's. The King had to 
pare government expenses wherever he could. As a result, many govern-
ment officials--both military and civilians:,-,-lost their jobs. 29 This 
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worsening financial situal;:ion, coupled, .wi.th the rise of democratic ideas 
from the West among Thai intellectuals who had been educated in Europe, 
led to the.1932 Revolution which ended the.control of the Royal family 
30 over the government. The-government.was r.eestablished on a new 
basis--that. of a constitutional monarchy •.. From. 1932 to 1938 the leader-
ship of the People's Party, the group of middle:,-level officials in the 
military and civil services who organized the Revolution, engaged in the. 
task of consolidating their power and.position •. It should be noted that 
the so-called "Promoters" (as the leaders of the People's Party called 
themselves) of the.coup were divided into. a variety. of groups which in 
subsequent years quarrelled and struggled with each other for political 
power. There were a number of coups and. countercoups during this. 
period. By 1938, the government leadership. appeared to be firmly in the 
hands of the military. In the realm of foreign affaire, however, 
Thailand sti11 maintained a neutralist position. In fact, .it waf:l the 
first Asian nation to express a neutralist position toward the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria in the 1930's. 31 
As one American observer points out, Thailand.' s. post,-1932 foreign 
policy may be summed up as one of strict impartiality and friendliness 
to all in tim~s of peace?, and safe neutrality or alliance with the vic-
32 tors.in times of war. The Siamese.regard themselves as members of a 
small country and by nature are nonaggressive.people, and, thus, they 
must-be the friend of all, or the friend.of the.victors. 33 In the 
1930's, Japanese power and prestige.was.rising. throughout Asia. Presum-
ably, Field Marshal Pibun was inclined toward the Axis powers, 34 
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Nevertheless, there was little evidence,-. that. Thailand intended to aban.,.. 
don its traditionally neutral policy. Pibun might have personally 
favored joining the Japanese, but the main .. elements in the Cabinet de-
sired to retain neutrality as.the.basic.foreign policy. The.government 
during this period frequently announced.-that it would vigorously resist 
35 any. invader. Yet, Thailand was ferced.,to cooperate with the Japanese 
in 1941. However, as Sir Josiah Crosby .has--observed, Thailand was by no 
means committed to the Japanese cause~ It.was only when. Thailand was 
finally convinced in Decel!lber, 1941, that no. help was forthcoming from 
the Allied Powers (Britain in particular). that Pibun decided to comply 
with Japan's requests and to become its ally. 36 
The Pibun government was forced out. of power s<;ion after Japanese 
defeat became apparent. The civilian gevernmen.t that took over faced a. 
difficult task of adjusting to an eventual Allied victory. The British 
demanded retribution from Thailand.- At this -stage, Thai. foreign policy 
37 became clear: the British were to-be played off against the Americans. 
The United States was.sympathetic to Thailand and, because of this, 
Thailand was able to emerge from the war. on. the side of the Allies. 
Once again Thailand reverted to a neutralist policy. 
It . should be. noted, however, that. the Cold War was .. in the making 
and at this.time had not reached Asia. The civilian government main-
tained a policy of nonalignment and neutralism which Thailand had.prac.,.. 
ticed in earlier years. Pridi, during. this period inttnediately following 
World War II, cultiviJ.ted relations with oth~r.states of the region. He· 
foresaw that the .nationalist forces in Burma., .. Indonesia, and Indochina 
would soon replace the weakened colonial.powers in the area. He be-
lieved that Thailand's_long history of independence and political 
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stability and its success in dealing .with .. European. powers made it a 
natural leader among these em.ergent.natiens. In.this regard, Pridi was 
moving toward an ant:l.colonialist policy .. and had laid a framework for 
regional cooperatien. Before he.could-pu~. this policy into effect, how-
ever, the civilian government under his.control.was. ousted by an army 
coup d'etat in November, 194 7, and. he- went .. into. exile. The military was. 
back in control of the ·government, and Pibun was · .. returned to rule the 
country once more. 
Shortly after Pibun' s return to power.,- the reef flag was .. hoisted in 
38 Peking. Thai foreign policy under._Pibun underwent a s:f,gnificant 
ch,nge in 1950 when he.departed from the traditional.neutra~ist policy 
by aligning Thailand. with th.e United States •. The People's Republic of 
China was the major factor that brought. about. this. change. Pibun was 
convinced that the main threat. to his .. country.' s security came from the 
north and could be met only with tQe support of. Communist China's 
39 strongest,adversary--the United States .... The emergence of a Communist 
revolutionary threat •. from the Chinese .. mainland. and. surrounding states in. 
Southeast Asia caused the Thai. leadership.considerable concern. In 
1953, the Chinese formed the so..-called !!Thai. Autonomous. People's 
Government'.' in the seuthem part ef. China. .•... This- suggested the. existence· 
40 of plans aimed at the .Thai in Southeast. Asia.. Thus, the Thai leaders 
thought or believed that China was the mast. serious .. threat to Thailand's· 
41 security. In 1954, Thailand accepted.without.hesitation United States 
Secretal;"y of State Dulles' invitatien. to . .join. the.Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), a defense pact against th~ Communist powers in 
Asia. In justifying this position in. September,. 1954, Prince Wan 
Waithayakern, the Foreign Minister, said: 
For the preservation of peace and.security Thailand has 
tried many. policies in the past., such as those of neutrality 
and of nonaggression treaties but found that they did no~ 42 
work, nor can any reason be seen why they should work now •••• 
This indicated the thinking of the Thai.leaders about the limita-
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tions·of neutralism. In the past, neutralism.a1,1d.nC:malignment only left 
them with nominal freedom.to go about their external affairs. Now that 
China in its propaganda was,threatening. Thailand, the Th.ai leaders be-
lieved th.at their security needs could best be served by allying with 
the West. 
This policy of alliance with the.West.and.the.United. States in par-
ticular has brought numerous benefits and.advances. to the Kingdom, but 
it has also brought certain risks, embarrassment, and uncertainties. 
The alliance with the United States has.been responsible for much of the 
economic progress of the country. Asof 1967, American economic aid to 
43 Thailand had totalled $464,400,000. United States firms and corpora-
tions were encouraged to make investments inThailand, and to date more 
44 than 100 of them have invested $130,000,000 •. Thai defenses have been 
greatly strengthened. The United States. has.provided arms and equip-
ment, while the Thai government has supplied.personnel. The Th.ai forces 
have expanded from 60,000 to 140,000 men.. The. United. States military 
assistance program trained another 60,000. in. the.police force. Since 
the outbreak of the Vietnam war and of the Communist insurgency in 
northeast Thailand, the United States has.stepped up its efforts in 
training and equipping Thai units .to meet.these.threats. The annual 
cost of American military aid is currently.estimated at $60,000,000. 45 
The total expenditure by the United States in the military aid program 
since 1950 has been $591,700,000. 46 
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While the United States-has-provided.nwn.erous benefits, it has also 
created prablems. Today, Thailand. is. dep.endent upon the United States 
both ecanomically and militarily; it has. lost. considerable autonomy in 
its foreign af~airs. The policy line in.Washington, D. c., under these 
circumstances, becames the palicy position. of. Thailand. There has been 
little alternative. Thailand has antagonizeg .. China. since 1950 because 
of its open alliance with the United .. States. . Taday, its territories 
cantain American bases .which are. used .. in .. the- Vietnam. war effart. Obvi-
ausly, this has antagonized sQme. of. Thailand.'s. neighbors, noti!,bly.Narth 
Vietnam. This alliance with the United--States. has. provided s~curity in 
the short run, but. in the long run as .. the containment. caalition breaks 
up, has created problems, for Thailand.. Thailand., under the alliance 
with the United States, has _been unable. to .. adjust to. the changing inter-
national canditions in Southeast· Asia .•.... It. does. not enjoy much flexi-
bility. An abrupt te1;'1llination of the alliance.with the United States 
would leave Thailand in a highly expo.sad. position. vis-a-vis the Chinese 
threat.· Whi,le this has not yet happened., the.United st,tes has indi-. 
cated that it has no intention of remaining. permanently in Southeast 
As:i:,a once the Vietnam war is settled.. The. way. the Vietnam. war current:!-y 
is being managed inhibits a flexible.Thai.responseto.China. 
The Thai"'."United States alliance.was.once put to a test.during the 
L~otian crisis in the early 1960's.and., mueh.to.the dismayaf the Thai, 
the.latter found that it did not.work.to their.satisfaction. Laas has 
always been regarded as vital t9 Thai .. secu-rity •. The. government of Field 
Mars];ial Sarit Thanarat desired tbe. es,;:ablishment. of a right wing gavern-
ment in Laos, and in this regard.tried.ta.cooperate.with the United 
States in bolstering tbe forces.a£ General Pho\,Ulli (Sarit's cousin) in 
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the struggle against the leftist Pathet Lao.·and the.·neutralist forces of 
General Kong Le. The United States; howe:ver,.failed to uphold its com-
mitment to preserve a pro-Western government.in. Laos and succumbed to 
pressures from Great Britain and Fr.ance te.· promote. a n.eutralist regime. 
SEATO was called upon by the Boon Oum~Phoumi.government fer assistance, 
but France and Britain oppased the position of.Phoumiand the prc;iposal 
47 was ultimately rejected. This. lukewarm attitude of.some. SEATO members 
irritated the Thai leaders and they began.to.question. the ut:t,lity of the 
alliance with the West. For the.first.time.since.1950 the Thai leaders 
48 voiced a desire to revert to a neutralist. course ...... However, an agree-
ment negotiated in 1962 between the. United. States Secretary of State 
Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat provided a:new.and.more sati~factory 
interpretation of United States-commitments •.. The. United Sta~es agreed 
to come to the assistance ef.Thailand.in the. event.of Communi$t aggres-
sion witheut. waiting for the "prior. agreement 11 . of the other SEATO mem-
b 49 ers. This understanding helped to reassure Thailand, and the 
inclination toward neutralism dissolved •.. 
Again, the Thai-United States alliance.is .. being put to the test. 
While the Thai government.has not taken.any·serious action leading to.a 
neu~ral position in the struggle against.the Communists, there arehigh 
level officials who are exploring the possibilities. As early as 1962, 
for example, Interior Minister.Praphas.Charutsat;:hien, the countryls. 
nu!illber"'."two man, openly advocated. a . revision. of. Thai.· foreign policy re-
quiring a break with tq.e United.States.and.a return.to traditional 
neutrality. Be. frankly declared: .. 
We sh(i)uld have a policy that. is.all our.own, peculiarly 
Thai--a Thai·dst policy that is based on. Thai history, Thai 
culture; and Thai intere$tS. In ancient times, our fore-
fathers from King Ramkanhaeng, the Great, and King Naresuan, 
the.Great, .to King Chulalo-ngkorn, the.Great;<ma~ageg to main ... 
ta.in the.independence o:f ·Thailatid·with·a policy peculiarly50 
Thai.... Why can't we carry out. such a.·pelicy of eur own?. 
Today.General Praphas; the most.likely.successor to the Thane~ 
gevei:-nment, is still advecating such,policy. However, it is difficult 
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to assess, precisely what he means by'. a ~'Thai.,.ist" pelicy. · His comments 
can be interpreted to . mean something. different.· than the traditional 
neutralist p<;>licy. He proba~ly means that;:.Thailand should pursue a. 
policy based strictly on Tha:f,. interes1;:s, and that it .. sheuld not allow 
anQthe~ country to dictate to it. Perhaps the.alliance may be main-
tained, but Thailand would have more.freedom.in.determining. its externoill 
and internal affairs without having to.give in: to.its.partner--meaning 
partic1;1larly the United States. . This. should. be. called an "independent'' 
policy. Thailand, under.these circumstances,.would.maintain the a:).li-
ance_with the West if it suited Thai.national interests, and Thailand 
could discard it:when it did not •. However,.when a.country wants te pur-
sue an independent policy, it does not.necessarily have to scrap its 
military pacts with ot;:her countries or.reve~t- to a.strict neutralist 
course. During recent years Tha:i.land.has.shown inclination teward a"Q. 
independent.position in its relations with Cummunist countries, and at 
the same time it has maintained its.alliance.with the United States. In 
1969, for example, That.land negotiated with.Romania and Bulgaria. a long-
term. trade pact, and in the following year a. ThaLmission t<i>ured the .. 
Soviet Unian and Eastern Europe to explore. the.possibility of establish-
ing mutually beneficial relationships •. By 1970, a.trade agreement with 
t~e Soviet .Union was .. concluded. . Also. in, 1969, . the Thai government for 
the first time publicly indicated its.willingness,to open.channels of. 
communication wit~ Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. 
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Thai negotiations with North Vietnam .co.ncerniug · the repatriation of 
Vietnamese refugees was.conducted in ,197.0 •. In November,· 1971, the Thai 
government also .decided to lift the ban on trade with China. 
A new position is undoubtedly evolving .in Thai.foreign policy. 
Yet, this· hardly. can be desc.ribed as. a po.licy of neutralism or nenalign-
ment, The Thai; of ceurse, could revert t:o .a .neutralist pelicy.. Seme of 
its neighbors today profess neutralism. Burma, for example, has pursued 
neutralism since the British granted it independence. Burmese neutral~ 
ism is mo~e. than just simple nonalignment. At times, Burma's behavior 
has been isolatio~ist vis-a-vis both East and West. For a number of 
years Burma practically closed its door .to .all fare.ign powers. There. 
were many contributing fact~rs to this response .to the international 
. 51 
environment. Inexperience in for.eign affairs was. one facto;. · Also, 
the.close proximity to Communist China induced.such a policy. For 
Burma, the United States was far away and .while the.United States gov-
ernment was.benign and friendly, Mao Ts.e-,Tung.and .his Chinese hol;'des. 
were.near.at hand and no Burmese leader could .guess the moment when the 
olive branch of peaceful coexistence .would be.lost in a deluge.of 
China's millions·moving south. 52 It should be noted, however, that 
Burma had only limited immediate.difficulties .with Communist Chin.ao The 
Burnese did not fear Communism as an .. ideology so much as they feared the 
day when China's masses would seek living space in their underpopulated 
53 country. Furthermore, the Burmese sincerely believed that internal 
problems would so occupy Chinese Communist .effort;.s.that·Peking would 
have neither.the heart nor the capability .for concerted action in er 
against Burma. Instead, the Burmese. gover~ent f~und that it ,wa~ the. 
remnants of the Kuomintang troops that continued to.be a problem for the 
country. To some extent, the presence .ef the. KMT treeps represented a 
direct threat to Burma's security, 54 The ·.Chinese ''.Ceminun.ists did· net 
intervene in thi$ matter. Burma's relationship with·Ccmrmunist China 
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continued to be cordial despite the fact .that.Burma had t~ give up part 
ef its territories to China in a border-dispute.in 1956. It was not 
until 1967 thli!,t Cemmunist China started tq .call.for the evetthrow of the 
Ne· Win government. Even se, the Burmese.leaders believed then, as they 
do now,.that nonalignment.is the foreign policy that best serves Burm.ese 
national interests~-
Another country that also professes nonalignment:and merits some 
considerations.is India. India's policy of .nonalignment has been con-
dition~d by.factors different.from those of Burma'.s. Indian nenalign-
ment is,often seen as the special creation of MJ::. Nehru, who often 
emphasized that ·his ceuntry's foreign policy .was ·.based on India ts cir-
55 cumstances·and past thinking. However, the .most important factor, 
probably, in determining India's .nonalignment .policy has-been the belief· 
that alignment represents a loss. of independence, .. influence, and pres-
56 tige. The Indian people .regard .themselves .as .a .potentially strong 
power, and believe.that participation.in .alliances would destroy this 
potential. Furthermore., the greater.pJ::oximity.of .the Soviet Union and 
China has made alliance with the West unwise •.. India is potentially a 
strong country, and it has been regarded .by. .the .Western power$ as a.key 
cQuntry in southern Asia. Nonalignment enables India ta benefit from 
relationships with both of the major powers .... 
Thailancl's.position is similar to tl').at ef India and Burma. Yet, 
the Thai gevernment,has been allied .with one large power blac against 
another. The· Thai leadership has always viewed China as.a serious. 
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threat to its security. Peking's propaganda has been threatening. All 
references to the Thai government in the Chinese press and radie have 
been antagonist:Lc·to its submission to-the .imperialists--the United 
57 States. The Chinese propagandists have also called for the overthrow 
58 of the Thai government. Unger these circumstances the Thai leader-
ship has been unable to switch to neutralism.or nonalignment. Although 
there.is some evidence that China's position toward Thailand is changing 
59 at this time, the uncertainties make a definite policy change impos-
sible. A "go-it-alone" policy at this stage .could .be very detrimental. 
Thailand would lose the material benefits of .the alliance with the 
United States and at the same time be unable to establish beneficial 
relationships with China or.the Soviet Union. The Vietnam war continues 
to pramote instability on Thailand's eastern borders. Also, the 
Communist-supplied insurgencies within the country provide a situation 
that prevents the Thai leadership from seriously giving up sources of 
support for as long as they can possibly make them last. 
To date, little progress has been made .insolving the insurgency 
problem. Recently, the Thai government .has secretly launched a major 
offensive against the insurgents, virtually wiping them out. in four 
60 provinces of the.north and the northeast •.. Military suppression, how-
ever, can be anly a temporary .solution at best; these insurgents are. 
bound to return. It.seems doubtful that Thailand will be able to salve 
this problem in the near future. A high~level official has already 
acknowledged it. In a press conference in .Bangkok in December, 1971, 
General Praphas Charutsathien openly stated.that the insurgency problem 
was.increasing. He said at the time that .the intens:Lty and the scale of 
war was expected to increase in the near. future as.· the insurgents 
61 obtained more and more modern weapons .from external powers. 
The outcome of the Vietnam war is vitally important to Thai secu-
rity. A professor in political science at Thammasat University has 
stated: 
The impact of the Vietnam war on .Thailand is total. It 
relates dir.ectly to our· security, .. it .has altered our way of 
life and sw0llen our ec0n0my. It should nat .. surprise anyone 
that we are vitally concerned about.what .happens there •••• 62 
Thailand's c0ncern with the outcome .of .. the war was manifested when the 
government decided to send Thai units to Vietnam in 1967. The number 
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rose to about 12, 000 men in 19 68. In .addi ticm, .six. airbases and a giant 
naval base were provided to the United States within Thailand from which 
to conduct the war, and Bangk0k became a rest and rehabilitation center 
for American troops stationed in VietnatJ,1 .. In 1969, the number of 
Americans in Thailand totalled 47,000 men. These soldiers have never 
been engaged in fighting the insurgents. The Thai government has never 
requested American soldiers to assist in solving this problem, It has 
always been Thai policy that the principal .responsibility for internal 
63 security rests with the Thai government •.. However, American soldiers 
in Thailand are being withdrawn. The .Thai .government, too, is contem-
plating the withdrawal of Thai troops in Vietnam ... At the time of this 
writing, Thai troops,are still stationed .there. These soldiers repre-
sent the Thai government's grave concern abeut the future of Vietnam. 
The possible Communist domination of all of Vietnam is viewed by the 
Thai leadership .as a majar threat ta the.secu;-ity af Thailand. 
Generally speaking, the Thai leadership wauld rather pursue a non-
alignment or neutralist policy. A neutralist policy is well kn0wn to 
them because af past experience; but there were certain conditions that 
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facilitated this policy. It seems .that .when.it worked for Thailand it 
was also su;l.table to the large powers in .the .regic:m and at the same time 
was.compatible with t~e internal political .situatien. But, teday-exter-
1 
nal political forces and the domestic situation render this policy un-
tenable. Tqe days af the happy buffer state .. between Great Britain and 
France are gone, and the leadership finds -the.Cammunist threat within 
Thailand too closely linked with the external .pressures that Thailand 
confronts. A shift in the power balance.is taking place in Southeast 
Asia as the United States.withdraws. Instead .of .finding itself in a 
buffer posd.tion as in the past, Thailand .itself .. is becoming another 
battleground as the Vietnam war widens~- .. Still .militarily _weak, 
Thailand cannot afford to "go-it-alone" .as .it .did .in.the past. 
If .Thailand were to adopt .a neutralist .policy.after the United 
States withdrawal is completed, it would.be.seriously exposed to Chinese 
pressures and would not be able to maintain a truly neutralist policy. 
A small power. cannot be neutral unless .certain internatienal power rela-
tionships exist which enable the .small state to function as a buffer be-
tween or among the large states. If .the.United .States withdraws and the· 
Soviet Union does not fill the vacuum, Thailand will be forced to lean 
toward China. 64 The Thai leaders.understand this. Also, neutralism 
wouid not guarantee Thailand against direct attacks from China or North 
Vietnam. Thus, Thailand must be extremely cautious in its consideratien 
of policy alternatives. 
Thailand still needs assistance .for its internal economic and sa-
cial development. It is possible that,. by .mainta:!-ning .a neutralist pol-
icy, Thailand may be able to acquire .aid.fr.om.countries other than the 
United States; including those dominated by Communist gover~ents~ 
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However, foreign assistance is more.difficult to negotiate now tha"Q. it 
was previously. The United States is .becaming much less incli~ed to 
provide assistance. Competing large .powers .possibly·cannot be depended 
upon hr aid under a neutralist policy. .It is conceivable that aid may 
be forthcoming from limited sources.and.then enly if foreign policy con-
cessions·are made. Under the alliance :with.the United States generous 
amounts of aid have been provided. This ·.entailed commitments, however. 
One other alternative would be for the,Great .Powers to neutralize 
Thailand and provide it with an international .guarantee for its ·indepen-. 
deuce. At the present time, strict neutralization applies only to two 
statea;J: Austria and Laos. The Austrian .example.points to the possible 
benefits of.neutralization; Laos to its dangers .and difficulty. To be 
effective any neutralization agreement .requires .. two basic .requisites--a 
degree of consensus within the government .concerned,. and the agreement 
among the interested pawers surrounding .the.state to respect the neutral-
ized status. 65 The Thai leadership strongly.opposed the neutralization 
of Laas. 66 Its failure has c.cmfirmed the .problem af .establishing a 
neutral state in Southeast Asia •.. This experience .discourages. the select-
ing af the neutr.alizatien option for .Tha~land •.. 
Neutralization of the whole Southeast .Asia .region is a possible 
alternative to neutralization on a .country .basis. It is conceivable 
thi!-t if the whole. region were neutralized, Thailand's interests ct,uld be 
realized under this structure. General De .Gaulle of France proposed 
this as a solution some. time ago, but Thailand .at .the time rejected it. 
Perhaps this approach should be reconsidereg •.. In the_ASEAN meeting of 
November, 1971, at Ku~la Lumpur, the .Thai .leadership .discussed the pos.,. 
sibility of neutralization of the whole.region. Thailand did sign a 
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neutralization declaration indicating.its.support. 67 More discussion on 
the subject is to be forthcoming at the .next .meeting. It seems now that 
68 the ASEAN is mov.ing toward that direction •... 
Any discussion of neutralism of .. any .one .of .the Southeast Asian 
states, or even the neutralization of the.whole .area, can hardly over-
look the significance of Communist China •... The .emergence of China as a 
major power has made it more difficult for .the Southeast Asian states to 
adjust to the changes introduced .by the new triangle of power and the 
69 ensuing local and regional disturbances. . In the old detente in which 
the United States and the Soviet Union were parties it was comparatively 
simple. It enabled the small countries to play off one major power 
against the other. In the emerging pattern there is much uncertainty. 
China is not the major power that a small country like Thailand can con-
front with ease. Up to the present time China.has not shown any inter-
est in the neutralization of Southeast Asia •. China, of course, has 
interests in the area. If there is no .countervailing large power in the 
region willing to offset Chinese power, Thailand cannot rely on neutral-
ism as a possible approach. 
It _is from the preceding analysis that .the writer believes Thailand 
is unlikely to adopt neutralism as a maj.or policy .position. Neutraliza-
tion of the whole region is a prospect, but .it is.still in the early 
stage.of development. This chapter has shown.that an "independent" 
pelicy is being considered in Thailand, but it should not be interpreted 
as a move toward neutralism. Thailand is bound to be influenced by its 
traditional policy. However, the present political situation renders 
the traditional alternative unlikely. This is not to deny that some 
future Thai government may choose or be forced to.opt for a neutralist 
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course as a result of changes in the balance ef .power in Seutheast Asia; 
it merely states that the time is not yet·right for Thailand te pursue 
such policy. · 
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CHAPTER.V 
IN SEARCH OF AN ASIAN CONCERT 
When the power and prestige of the major European nations began to 
erode in.confrontation witli nationalist movements in Southeast Asia.at 
the end of World War II and afterwards, the international relations of 
Southea~t Asian states inevitably ha4 to change. The advent of in4epen-
dence meant that the.emerging Soutlieast: Asian states.would need to de-
velop patterns of relations both with their neighbors and other nations 
of the world, including their former rules. .The years immediately .. fol-. 
lowing World War·II (1945-1958) were fe,rmativ:e years for the new South~ 
1 east Asian states in the determination of foreign policy. The task was 
not easy. Partly, this was because the ruling elites were inexperienced 
in foreign affairs; but, also, becau~e the peoples in Southeast Asia 
2 under.colonial control had been isolated from each other. The·peoples 
of the.area hardly knew each ether. The linguistic and religious diver-
sities caused misunderstandings. Century-old animosities between cer""-
tain peoples aroused fear and suspicion, .and were manifested in the 
3 relationships betweei;,. the newly established states. Consequently, 
rather varied approaches to foreign policy emerged in Southeast Asia. 
Thailand in the 1950's .switched from a neutralist stance to a.firm 
pro-American policy and particip.ated in containment programs designed to 
prevent Communist expansion in the region .... Cambodia and Burma emerged 
as neutralists. Indonesia, suspicious of Western pewers, also apted for 
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neutralism and tried to make a serious bid for leadership in the area. 
Malaysia and Singapore clung to their former r.ules,,Great Britain. Laos 
has remained a pseudo-independent state, .and.its foreign policy has been 
subject to the will of its stronger neighbors. Vietnam was partiti~ned 
into two parts--North and South, North Vietnaiµ is under the leadership 
of the Communists who have sought to reunite the .two parts. South 
Vietnam, heavily dependent upon the United States, has been involved in 
a bloody encounter with Communist forces seeking to re1,mite the two 
parts under Communist leadership. Southeast .Asia, as these events indi-
cate, has been confronted with constant political turmoil. Certainly, 
during the formative years following World War II there was little 
opportunity to establish regional unity. 
However, when one looks closely at the foreign policy objectives of 
these various countries, one finds similarities in interests. These_ 
states have been primarily concerned with ,the. problem of establishing 
national identity and preserving independence. 4 .Most of them have been 
fearful of wars between the major powers.and .concerned over specific 
events that could lead to such a war. The leaders of these small and 
weak states understand fully the dangers of majer war. They would like 
to keep themselves free of commitments that would involve them, but this 
is difficult when big powers are so competitively active in the regien. 
Also, to develop a viable state economic development and modernization 
is necessary. A measure of political stability.is required and much 
assistance from the richer statef;I has been sought. However, military 
and economic aid from the large powers has entangled the smaller states 
in the "Cold War" and has endangered their lilurvival. When great powers 
become involved they seem to have a way of complicating these problems. 
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The·United Nations has been looked to as an alternative,~·but it is weak 
and not able under Cold War conditions to. help. solve the problems of the 
individual smaller states. It is not capable.of decisive acti9Il when a 
major security problem arises and it; is also.unable to provide large 
quantities of eCOilOmic and technical assistance. Thailand, among other 
nations, beloilgs to the United Nations,and it has·acquired limited 
assistance from.it. 
Southeast Asian st~tes .must find an alternative te e~cessive entan-
glement with the big pewer1;1 and a too.heavy.rel:1,.auce on the United 
Nations. They must·. exploit the eppc;,rtunities that might possibly exist 
in.the changing relationships among the big pewers that would permit. 
regienal initiative and development. Thestates in the region, if .this_ 
is to happen, must dissolve communicatien .. barriers .and plan coherent 
patterns.ef regional cooperatien. 
A great deal has happened in Southeast .. Asia ... since the beginning ef. 
the 1960's. During this time the basic foreign policies of key cour;i-
tries in the region have crystallized. Many.of.the problems, such as 
the Co11111lunist th~eat.from Nortl;i. Vietnamand .. China, the failure of neu-
tralization in Laos, and the ousters .. of .Sukarno. in Indonesia. an,d 
Sihanouk in Cambodia, have· shed new light on._.the foreign policy .strate-
gies of the~e various states. While changes ... in foreign policy aJ;'e in 
the making, for all Southeast Asian states basic goals remain the same. 
These goals--economic development, pelit:f,cal stability, freedo~ from 
outside inte]:"ference, and self7determination..,...,.continue to be.the basic. 
dc;,mestic .and fc,reign policy objectives .of ,.these .states, and will remain 
so for many years to come. The leaders,of the.Seutp.east Asian states 
are beginning te seek ways to work together in solving major problems 
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and realizing common objectives, They are talking about Asian solidar-
ity, Thailand is a key state in the region.. Thai foreign pelicy is 
oriented toward building regional solidarity.to.enable Southeast Asian 
states as a group to be more self-reliant and less.dependent on the. 
super powers, Regional cooperation seems to be.the most logical option 
available to Thailand. 
Regionalism is not a new concept.in the.area. For two years.fol-
lowing the collapse of Japan in 1945, Thai foreign policy was largely 
determined by Pridi Panomyong, Pridi.had.definite ideas about the role 
that Thailand should play in Southeast . .Asian .. affairs, While maintaining 
good official relations with the victorious Allies, partic~larly the 
United States, Pridi was also interested in making Thailand the leader 
of the independent nations in this part of Asia, 6 He foresaw that 
sooner or later colonialism would end, and that Thailand should be pre-
pared for a larger role in this region, In his initial attempts Pridi 
advocated a "Pan Southeast Asia Union," which would be sponsored by 
France and Thailand, This Union would initially consist of Thailand, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as free and.independent.states. Burma, 
Malaya, and Indone~ia would be invited to join.later. In effect, Pridi 
was advocating, probably for the first time.in.Thailand's history, a 
7 foreign policy of regional cooperation. . ... Pridi believed that Thailand's 
long history of independence and its success.in dealing with the 
European powers made it the natural leader among these.emergent nations. 
It wa~ an ambitious program of an extraordinary.man who seemed to have 
unlimited faith in his ability to guide Thailand. However, France did 
not .. reciprocate, and the scheme was ultimately.rejected, 
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Toward the autumn of 1947, a Southeast Asia League wasfonned in 
Bangkok, Pridi was.moving toward an anti-,colonialist policy in an 
effort to align Thailand with the emerging.states.of Southeast Asia. 
This organization was significant in that it.came into existence after 
the Dutch ''police acti.on" in Indonesia, .. A .. number. of Pridi' s followers 
were members of this organization as well as exile leaders from neigh-
boring states who wanted to expel the colonial.powers.from their home::.. 
8 lands. It did not progress far because.of.the coup of November, 1947, 
which overthrew Pridi's government, The succeeding regime was.not in-
terested in the .organization, which was .. soon .. dissolved, 
Since 1950, increasing international.tension as well as domestic 
difficulties forced Thailand to the side .. of the United States. In 1950, 
in commitment to the anti-Communist cause, the Pibun government signed a 
treaty with the United States which brought .. to. Thailand military and 
economic aid. In an effort to promote regional security, Thailand in 
1954 became one of.the three Asian members in the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), 
SEATO did not live up to Thai expectations, however. In reality 
membership created a dilemma for Thailand because the treaty was based 
to a large extent on the anti-Chinese.attitude.of the United States, As 
an Australian scholar once put. it, "the viability .. of. Thailand's stand 
depends vitally on the United States position. . If. that position were· 
suddenly reversed and accommodation reached.with.China, Thailand would 
be left out on a.limb,"9 SEATO has been a multilateral alliance more in 
appearance than in actuality; it has not.been.able.to.cope with.the 
political and military problems of the region,. Thai suspicion of the 
alliance began to grow during the Laotian crisis of 1962.lO In spite of 
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its many short~omings, however, SEATO has.:-PrCilvided an additional channel 
for economic and technical development-within .. Southeast Asia; and 
Thailand cannot deny.the benefits it has.derived from the alliance. The· 
alliance also encouraged the involvement,of.other s1;ates in the region. 
Australia, and to a lesser e~tent, New Zealand, became active through 
SEATO in Southeast Asian affairs. 
11 Fearful of the ch.ange in the course -of .American . foreign policy, 
the Thai leaders have.attempted to develop more intimate economic; cul-
tural, and social contacts with other nc,n...,,Communist-nations in Asia. In 
spite of numerous cultural, historical, and economic obstacles to 
regional unity, the Thai leaders believe .. that .cooperation among tl;le na-
tions in the area is possible. The Thai.Foreign.Minister, Thanat 
Khoman, has been the principal.architect.of.the .policy.of Asian "region-
alism," which has earned him the. informal .. ti.tle. of "father" of. Southeast 
12 Asian unity. The announced withdrawal of.the British.east of Suez by. 
197113 and the uncertainty regarding the .. American.comm.itment to defend 
the region intensified Thai concern. In.its.qu~st.for.wh~t Thanat calls 
a "positive foreign policy," important initiatives and constructive 
measures have been taken by the Thai government.to build a new structure 
for regional cooperation in the political, economic:,.soci,1 and cultural 
14 fields. They are intended to consolidate.national.freedom and inde-
pendence by bringing together the activities.of .. countries which share 
common stakes and interests. No plans for military cooperation have 
15 been proposed. 
The first step in Southeast Asian regional cooperation was the for-
mation of the Association of Southeast .. Asia- (ASA) . in 1961. by Thailand, 
Malaya, and the Philippines, on the basis of the Bangkok Declaration of 
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July of that year. Its purpose was.to.promate;cooperation in economic, . 
social, scientific, and administrative.affairs and to.provide machinery 
for mutual. assistance in exploiting .. natural -r.esources, developing agri-
16 culture and industry, and expanding trade •..... The,.organizatian stressed. 
the absence of ties with any outside .power .. or.bloc •.. Both the United 
States . and China, hewever, barely recognized .. the Association's exis-
17 tence. The Association of ·Southe&!,st Asia wasunable to achieve its 
objectives. Apart from.the repercussio.n.of.the.Viet'Qam war, it also 
suffered from conflicts within the region, .. sucq as the confrontation be-
tween Malaysia. and the Ph:f:.lippines. Only .when, .. through Thailand's ef-
forts, reconciliation was achieved .among these countries in 1966, was 
the way opened again for developing regional cooperation. Thailand used 
ASA as a base upon which to build broader approaches to regional coopef-
ation. 
The Association of Southeast Asia w.as emlarged.to include Indonesia 
and Singapore in a new .regional organization .. called the Association of· 
Southeast-Asian Nations, which.was .established.in, .a.meeting at Bangkok 
in 1967. Efforts were made to being in .other.Asian.nations such as 
Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Ceylon in order.to .include more nonaligned 
states. Indonesia is the only nonaligned .. member... Although emphasis. in 
the new organization is economic and .socialcooperation, the door.is 
18' open to political and military. cooperation ... · .. 
The Association of Southeast Asian .. Nations .offers hope for coopera-
tion among the Southe,;1.st Asian nations. .It is ... strictly an Asian enc;leav-
or. The structure should have great attr,;1.ction.for.the Asian states. 
It appeals to the nationalist yearnings. of their .educated elites. ta 
exercise an independent voice in world affairs. As of.late 1971, 
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however, despite standing invitations for memb.ership, Burma, Cambodi~, 
and Ceylon hq1.ve not joined the organization. -The.absence of these 
states should not hamper the work of tl;le .organization, however. 
The ASEAN members have agreed . to .cooperate -in .. the fields of. food 
production, commerce and industry, civil .aviation,.tourism, and cemmuni..,.. 
cation. 19 Also, they have used the organization-in.efforts to settle 
political problems. Under the auspices ,of .ASEAN, .. the .Djakarta Ccmfer-
ence on Camboditil in May, 1970, was convened.by.the.gevernment of. 
Indonesia in an attempt to deal with. the .prob.lem.:created 'qy tl,le Nerth 
20 Vietnamese general offensive against.the-Khmer.forces. This was the 
first t:1,me that states in.Asia (from Australia ta.Japan) were able to 
assemble in an effort to find Asian solutions .to.Asian problems. In 
spite of the fact that nothing concrete.resulted, this was an indication 
that Asian states are attempting to cooperate .. in.efforts to solve 
regional problems. In terms of participants.alone, it was a remarkable 
development. For the first time in 25 years,. the.Japanese Fore:l.gn 
Minister met with most of the ether.nations.for the.announced purpose of 
discussing a security problem. . This markec;l .. Japan's. increasingly. frank 
21 concern .with the. politics and security .of .Southeast .Asia. 
As the United States moves closer to .a .. detente -With Chin,a and the 
Soviet Union, the Southeast Asian nations-are.forced.to move.closer to-
gether. In November, 1971, the Foreign.Ministers.of.ASEAN states met.in 
Kuala L4mpur for a discussion of the.possibility of neutralizing the 
whole Southeast Asian region.· In the November.meeting, the ASEAN 
22 "Southeast Asia neutralization" declaration .. was .-signed. It appears 
that Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and.the Philippines have 
23 developed a closer working relationship. This became apparent at the 
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fifth annual ministerial conference in Singapore.in April, 1972, At 
this particular Conference, the five members agreed to give th~ir asso-. 
ciation a. political as well as an economic .o.rientatian. 24 Among the 
more important suqjects discus$ed was .the .p.roposal .for. the ne~traliza-
tion of Southeast Asia which the ASEAN countries jointly declared in 
Kuala Lumpur in the November meeting •. In.an .interview in Bangkok con-
cerning the subject, Dr. Thanat hinted.that.the major.powers appeared to 
25 be interested. However, the plan is.still in. the early stage of 
development and it will take some time before it can be fully imple-
mented. 
The Soviet Union's attitude toward Southeast Asian neutralization 
appears to be negative. The Russians simply.do.not believe that neu-. 
tralization can become operative because the-countries concerned do not 
26 occupy a neutral position. Thailand, for instance, is taking an 
active part in the Vietnam war, and the Philippines, although not 
directly involved in that war, continues to belong to SEATO. Perhaps 
the Soviet Union is more concerned with.rising.Chinese influence than 
with other aspects of Southeast Asian politics •. To date, China has not 
responded to the neutralization scheme. It.seems that certain advan-
tages.would be realized by China. The immediate.advantage of neutrali-
zation to China would lie in the removal.of.some, if not all, United 
States military forces from the area •.. At the .same time it would prevent 
the Soviet Union from expanding further into Southeast Asiao Neutrali-
zation, if adopted, would require China.to refrain.from supporting pro-
Communist revolutionary forces in the neutralized.area. This would 
conflict directly with the revolutionary commitment. to ''wars of national 
liberation" entertained by the present leadership in Peking. On the 
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other hand, it is possible that Peking would be.more.interested in get-
ting the "two superpowers" out of the.region-than.in directly involving 
itself in the politics of states within the region. 
Neutralization should merit serious consideration within the United 
States government. Since the United States .is.cdntemplating withdrawal 
from the region, some.guarantee of the status.quo.in.Southeast Asia can 
be provided through neutralization. At least.neutralization seems.to be 
in line with the Nixon Dbctrine which stresses a retrenchment of United 
States' involvement in the area, 
Regional collaboration is also promoted through.the Asian and 
Pacific Council (ASPAC), which is comprised of.South Korea, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Nationalist China, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and South Vietnam, with Laos as _.an observer. Formed in 1966, 
ASPAC seeks greater mutual assistance and-solidarity.among Asian and 
Pacific countries in their endeavors.to.protect.themselves from the 
Conununist threat and in the development of their.respective economies. 27 
ASPAC is significant because it includes as.members Japan and Australia. 
By 1969, in the economic, social, and cultural.fields, ASPAC's modei;;t 
but encouraging achievements comprise the establishment of a Registry 
of Experts in Canberra, and an ASPAC Social and Cultural Center in 
Seoul, a Food and Fertilizer Center in Taipei, and, in principle, an 
28 Economic Cooperation Center in Bangkok. Equal significance should be 
given to the usefulness of ASPAC as a forum .. for close. consultation and 
frank exchange of views on political matters .. of interest to Asia. This 
purpose has not thus far been marred by political 4ifferences among the 
member countries. 29 
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ASPAC already has taken a firm .stand.on.several important regi(;)nal 
issues. At its third annual conference.in.Australia in August, 1968, 
ASPAC expressed support for South Vietnam.and South.Korea in their ef-
30 forts to protect themselves against external. aggressien. It expressed 
hope that diplomatic negotiations. in .Paris .. between the United States and 
North Vietnam woul~ result in the cessatian .. Qf . hostilities in Vietnam, 
and it upheld the right of the government of.South.Vietnam t0 exist and 
to fully participate in any agreement concerning.its territory. 31 
Thailand has consistently stressed the view that ASPAC should remain 
non-military and non-ideological, while some.other members, notal;,ly 
South Korea and Nationalist China, hav:e.sought.to transform the organi-
zation into an anti-Communist military.alliance. 32 Thailand has also 
held the view that ASPAC.and ASEAN are complimenting each other and that 
33 neither hampers the work of the other •. 
The prevailing winds of detente between the.superpowers have also 
1:1wept over ASPAC. At the ASPAC's fifth annual ministerial conference in 
June, 1972, for the first time in its.history, the.organization, led by 
South Korea, decided to open its door to all countries regardless of 
"ideology.or political syst:em11 • 34 This.includes, .of course, North 
Korea, North Vietnam, and China. There was.also some.talk of merging 
ASPAC and ASEAN into one. 35 It is now conceivable.that an Asian region-
alism will be established in the foreseeable.future. 
The fact that various countries in the Southeast Asian region and 
in the Pacific have been able to get; together and cooperate in working 
out solutions to some.Asian problems is encouraging to the Thai leader-
ship. These organizations represent concerted.actions of the countries 
involved and they see in each other's interests a mutual concern to 
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remain free and independent. The future.of these organizations is not 
certain, since they are in their early stages of development. At this 
time, some.poliiical strength has b.een.generated.thraugh these organiza-
tions through cansultation and exchanges.ofideas. Unity among these 
states can enhance their positicm vis-,.a-,.vis the outside powers. For 
·• 
this reason, Thailand·has been in the forefront during the last decade 
in the cultivation and nurturing of these.regional.organizations. 
Thailand is geographically in the.centel:' .of Southeast Asia, which 
provides it with a strategic location between.Japan and Australia, and 
between Japan and India. For geopolitical.reasons.alone, Thailand is in 
an ideal position to offer itself.as a.nkey.link" between these states. 
As Dr. Thanat Kh(\)man puts it, "Thailand may be called the main sail af 
the Southeast.Asian ship and has thus been.buffeted by political winds 
coming fram different directions. 1136 The geographic factor seems to 
have some importance to Thlil,iland's position on Asian regionalism. 
Thailand, in recent years has become .. the .. center .of many activities in 
Asia, and Bangkok's foreign relations.currently has important implica-
tions for the whole of Southeast Asia •.. 
Thailand also participates in cooperative.efforts in education and 
research through its membership in the Southeast .Asian Ministers of .. 
Education Secretariat .(SEAMES) comprising.Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, and South Vietnam, SEAMES, formed in 1965, is engaged in 
cooperative research in agriculture, tropical biology, tropical medicine 
and public health, education in science.and.mathematics, language study, 
37 and educational innovation and technology. Other cooperative efforts 
include the annual Ministerial Conference fo.r. the Economic Development 
of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, the 
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Philippines, and South Vietnam) whic~ .was .. formed in 1966; the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), inaugurated in-1966.under United Natiens aus-
pices; the Mekong River Development .Proj.ect __ (Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, 
and Seuth Vietnam), set up in 1957 to develop the wate~ resources of.the 
38 lower Mekong basin; and the.Colombo.Plan for Cooperative Economic 
Development initiated in 1950. 
Cooperation through the United .Nations .const.itutes an important; 
part of Thai foreign policy. Since .. the, time ef ci.ts .j.qining in 1946, 
Thailand has supported the United Nations' .varied.activities. It was 
the first Asian nation to back the United -Nations' .intervent:l.on in 
Korea by furnishing a contingent of cembat troops.to.serve under the 
flag of the UN command. In the economic.re~lm, Bangkok is the site of 
the Ec~nomic Commies.ion for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), a regional 
commission of the United Nations. Bangkok.also-served as the site for a. 
ministerial meeting of Asian developing nations in.preparation for the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) held in New 
Delhi in 1968. The Thai government has always held the.view that the 
United Nations.should assert.a greater role.in seeking to reconcile the 
conflicting positions of the Great .Powers •.... 
Thus, it can be seen that Thaifo.reign.policy during the last de-
cade has been oriented in.the direction.of.regional cooperatien. 
Thailand's stress on regional cooperation.is .. credited to Fore:f,.gn Minister 
Thanat Khoman's personal dedication.to.the idea. Ironically, however, 
it was also due to Thanat that close cooperation.between Thailand and 
the United States in the 1960' s was .forged •.. In .addition to his role in 
promoting the formation of ASA, ASEAN, .and .ASPAC,. and ether cooperat;ive 
ventures, Thanat was the first Asian leader to appeal for an all-Asia 
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ccmference to settle the Vietnam war. .He was .also the first to call on 
Japan to assume a role.in Asia commensurate.with its enormous economic 
powers. Thanat stresses political and ecgnomic cooperation rather than 
military alliances,as the optium way oLstrangthening the_smaller Asian 
39 nations vis-a-vis the outside powers •. His view on developments in 
Asia after the Vietnam war.focuses on ASEAN and ASPAC as major pillars 
of a future "Pax Asiana. 11 However, regional .co.operation through these 
organizations does not represent a "Third.Force" which will remain neu.-
40 tral and will _be able to mediate large .. power conflicts. Even though 
Thanat is temporarily out of the government, he nevertheless continues 
to play an active role in the shaping of ... Thai .foreign policy. He was 
appointed Special Envoy to the ASEAN meetings.in Novel)lber, 1971, and 
again in April, 1972. His thoughts on Asian regionalism will rema:i,n the 
pillar of Thai fareign policy for some time .to . come •. 
The new accent.on self-reliance and.regional.cooperation represents 
a major change in Thai foreign policy .since.1968 •. Nevertheless, one 
question remains: is regienal cooperation.feasible? Between the large, 
off-shore archipelogoes,of Indonesia and the Philippines and the arc of 
mainland nations stretching from Burma to Vietnam, there are no close 
ties. Within this cluster of nations, .there is a history of conflict 
that goes back many centuries. Apart from the.historical and cultural 
factors, numerous,economic impediments.also.confront the Asian leaders 
who desire regional unity. 41 However, despite all that militates 
against regional cooperation, the subject .has. be.come .ever more prominent 
in the pronouncements of.the Asian leaders •. It is treated more seri-
ously in Djakarta and Bangkok and other capitals .of .the area than is 
commonly thought. These discussions.have grown livelier as more and 
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more Asian leaders, watching American reactions .to the unhappy experi-
ence in Vietnam, have come to realize that.the United States is about to 
withdraw from the region as a major .force ...... . 
It is recognized that any Asian endeavor aiming at regional cooper-
ation will experience difficulties. Since.most countries of the region 
are economically backward, .there seems.to .be.little basis for energetic 
economic cooperation. If _these efforts,.namely, development of manpower 
resources, the creation of more employment.opportunities, the promotion 
of economic growth in rural areas, tourism, investment of foreign indus"':' 
tries, continue in their present uncoordianted.patterns, they will not 
be as productive as they might be under a cooperative program of devel-
opment. Economic progress has been evident .in.Singapore, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and the Philippines during the.last decade. If _these states 
could cooperate, they could learn from each other's successes and mis-
takes, Furthermore, some major powers can be counted on to give assis-
tance. 
It does not appear that economic coope:i:ation will be the big prob-. 
lem in the 1970' s. A bigger problem. is the .Communist threat that con-
fronts the region. It is a common problem for.all, and it might very 
well serve as a uniting force. There is.little doubt that Southeast 
Asian leaders. believe that China, and China '.s. support for internal dis-
sident groups, represents the main threat to the region's security, 
Since the most.likely threat from China is through subversion and sup-
port for revolutionary groups, it is conceivable that Southeast Asian 
states can mobilize their forces.in joint combat.operations against the 
challengers. They can cooperate in solving the social and economic 
problems that the Communists exploit, Although Dr. Thanat does not 
105 
believe in the militarization of the ASEAN. nations, he once stated that 
Southeast Asianization is a possibility in-dealing with the internal 
insurgency within Southeast Asia. 42 Support from states outside of the 
region also may be required. 
The United States seems determined .to .extricate it:self from the. 
quagmire of its military commitments in.Indochina. Cooperation among. 
the Asian states through regionalism can facilitate the success of the 
"Nixon Doctrine." Prior to his coming to office in 1967, Mr o Nixon 
wrote.an article in a professional journal stressing Asian solidarity as 
an alternative to United States overcommitment in Asia. 43 Undoubtedly, 
the United States has a very constructive role to play, although not in 
terms of direct military involvement, in.helping to bring about Asian 
solidarity. Indeed, the United States national interest has always re-
quired more than one center of power in Asia •. Conflict with Japan re-
sulted from Japan's efforts to consolidate all .of Asia under its 
hegemony; and United States antagonism .. toward China more recently can be 
explained in terms of a fear that China is attempting to dominate all of 
44 Asia. These regional endeavors, with immense population and resources 
behind them, can provide a base for another center of power in Asia. 
China's_ ambitions can be thwarted, Southeast Asian r.egional solidarity 
made possible by United States economic and.technical assistance can 
serve United States foreign policy inte:r:estso 
In this connection, a strong and viable Thailand is indispensible 
for the growth of Southeast Asian regionalism and the reduction of 
United States commitments. Thailand's success in regional diplomacy and 
domestic progress can enhance the security .of the .entire region. In the 
general terms of Asian-United States interaction, Thailand can play a 
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key role.in helping to bring about Asian solidarity, which, in turn, 
will permit the United States to reduce its commitment in Asia in the 
coming decade. A mutual long-range interest is present. The process 
will, of course, be a subtle, compli.cated,- .and time-consuming one. 
Without,the United States' help, it is very unlikely that the scheme 
will succeed. 
While American soldiers are being withdrawn. from the region, United 
States naval forces still remain in. the .ar.ea. These forces can serve as 
a bulwark against any. future Communist attack. The. United States has 
already promised a shield under the Nixon Doctrine. If the countries of 
the region can be really united, with the United States military might 
in the background, defense of the region can be provided. 
Another country that has deep interest in the security and stabil-
ity of Southeast Asia because of its economic interests is Japan. Japan 
is now the third ranking economic and.industrial power in the world. 
Although militarily restricted by its Constitution, its political power 
is on the rise concomitant with its economic might, and will be increas-
ingly felt in many. parts of the globe.. Thus, we quite naturally can 
expect that as Japan's trade and investments in the region multiply, a 
political policy will inevitably follow,_ Howe.ver, memories of ill-
treatment during the Japanese occupation. of the. region during World 
War II still linger, and many countries of .. the region view Japan with 
suspicion, The activities of Japanese businessmen today are a cause for 
concern; many countries have.charged "unfair. business practices" against 
45 the Japanese. Yet, these are minor impediments to regional cooperaf-
tion. The Japanese have shown a growing interest by giving financial 
aid. to the nations.of Southeast Asia. In 1967, Japanese aid to the 
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region amounted to $190,000,000, or about half of all official Japanese 
'd i ' h 46 ai g ven int at year. It is anticipated. that Japanese aid will in-
crease over the coming years. Japan's. preoccupation at present seems to 
be with trade for purely commercial gain., but in the future it may be in 
a position to exercise influence· commensur.ate with its economic standing 
and political aspirations. Japanese presence in Southeast Asia can.be 
constructive in developing Asian regional solidarity. 
So far as Thailand is concerned, Thai.,...Japanese relationships have 
always been cordial, Unlike most Southeast Asian countries, Thailand 
did not emerge from the war with bitter memories of Japanese occupation, 
There are no conflicts resulting from competing. aspirations for regional 
leadership which seems to characterize Indonesian-Japanese relations, 
However, frictions in the cc:immercial sphere do. occur. As noted, the 
Thai deficit in its trade with Japan has steadily widened, and govern-
ment officials seem to be unable to agree o.n solutions. Yet, Thailand 
agrees with the Nixon Administration that.Japan should expand its eco-. 
nomic and political role in Southeast Asia and this can include a 
greater security role for Japan. Japan has. been actively participating 
in some regional endeavors such as ASPAC and the Djakarta Conference on 
Cambodia (May, 1970), and has made significant contributions to the 
Asian Development Bank and the Mekong Project sponsored by the riparian 
states.and United Nations agencies. More recently, the Japanese govern-
ment announced that Japan would increase its foreign aid up to one per-. 
cent of its GNP by 1975. 47 Indeed, this was welcomed by all Southeast 
Asian nations, In the political realm, however, Japan still remains 
ambivalent, 
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Political events are moving fast in Asia today and Japan has had 
some difficulty responding. Japan has experienced a number of "shocks." 
In 1971, it was the "Nixon shocks',' that irritated the Japanese most. 
Japan's own security is closely. tied to the United States. Since Japan 
possesses such a great potential for an active role in world affairs, 
the United States has insisted that Japan share greater responsibilities 
for Asian security. Japan has constantly .. resisted this request. In 
1971, Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's. special adviser for security 
affairs, made a surprise visit to China, which. was followed by the 
announcement.that the President.himself.would visit Peking. This was 
followed by the President's surcharges against. imports, which were aimed 
at Japan. Japan's trade with the United States is central to its econ-
omy, and the combination of these politic.al and econamic initiatives by 
President Nixon seriously called into question the assumptions.on which 
Japanese foreign policy has been based. The Nixon Doctrine is bringing 
the United States closer to cooperation.with the Soviet Union and China. 
This was evident in the President's visits. to both countries. One clear 
result is that the "special relationship!' that characterized the Tokyo-
Washington ties during the 1950's and the 1960's has come to an end. 
As a consequence, Japan will be forced to reappraise its present foreign 
policy. The time is too early to tell what changes will occur, but it 
is possible that Japan will concentrate its energies in the Asian and 
Pacific regions. If it does, Asian solidarity can be significantly 
strengthened as a result of extensive Japanese participation. 
Another country that has a deep interest in peace and stability in 
So.utheast Asia is Australia. Located in the end of a great land bridge 
from mainland Southeast Asia into the Pacific, Australia has always 
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regarded what happens in Southeast Asia. as ·vi.ta! .to its own. security. 
Its proximity to the Southeast Asian area.has.indicated a-strategic role 
for Australia in defense arrangement relating to Southeast Asia. 48 In-
fluenced by the Japanese threat during Worl&War II, Australia had main-
tained a "forward defense" strategy •. This.means that the potential 
Communist Chinese threat to Southeast Asia has. come to be appreciated as 
a threat to Australia as well. Over the years, isolation or a "fortress 
Australia" strategy has never seemed practical to the successive 
49 Australian governments. This is the reason why it joined SEATO and 
became active in most regional endeavors in Asia •. SEATO has proven to 
be weak, Australia has actively and cons.tructively participated in a 
number of regional efforts with many of.itsAsian neighbors, Australia 
ranks high as an industrially advanced state; it contributes economic 
assistance to other nations, particularly in the Southeast Asia region, 
The decision of the British to withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia 
altogether by 197150 caused profound concern in Australia, and the im-
pact of the "Nixon sliocks" was just as great. Essentially, Australian 
foreign policy has been characterized by. its participation in various 
11 . 51 a iances. While the alliances .. have yet to be. repudiated, Australia's 
two "big brotl).ers" have decided to leave., and this fact has been very 
unsettling to the Australians, Australia. now knows that it cannot count 
on the big powers. The choices open to the.Australian government are 
whether it should decide to "go-it-alone," or join other Asian nations 
in regional cooperation since Australia.is geographically "part" of 
A$ia, The trend to "go-it-alone" seems limited, Australia's activities 
in regional cooperation have been. increasingly. apparent. Australia now 
has defense commitments with Malaysia, Singapore, and New Zealand. The 
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significance of its power is debatable •.. Nevertheless, it seems ts be 
pursuing a constructive approach to Southeast Asian problems. 
Another country. that has to be.·reckoned. with is the Soviet Union. 
With the Soviet announcement of an inter.es.t. in an. Asian se.curity system, 
the Russians have thereby indicated the intention of increasing their. 
presence in certain strategic areas along .. the sea. r.outes between the 
Suez and the.Pacific Ocean. Russian. activities. in Asia are growing, and 
today there is less hostility and suspicion. tC;>ward t;he Soviet Union than 
52 a few years. back. The presence of the s.ovie.t Union is indeed signifi-
cant. Its future role, which is believed to be capable of acting as a 
counterpoise to the growing power.of.Mainland. China,. is an important 
factor in the power equation and will be watched with interest by coun-
tries in the area, With respect to Asian regional cooperation, however, 
initial responses to these organizations ha.vebeen uniformly hostile or 
negative. They have attacked Asian regional. efforts as nothing more 
than the activities of Japanese and.American. lackeys. 53 However, with 
Soutoeast Asia committed to further. multilateral c.ooperation the Soviet 
Union must, it seems, accept this approach. or lose .. all influence in the 
area, Significantly, after having shown. some. distaste for the Asian 
Development Bank, Soviet diplomats now have. hin.ted that the Soviet 
Union, which already participates in the. Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East (EGAFE), may join the.Bank.. 54 Thus, Moscow appears 
convinced that Asian regional cooperation will proceed despite Soviet 
attitudes; refusal to accept ASPAG, ASEAN, and. other groupings can only 
make Asians turn to the United States or Japan. And. since Moscow has 
little hope of creating a new Asian organization of its own, its best 
interest seems to lie in cooperation with existing regional groupings 
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outside the framework of an American.defense.system in Asia. In this 
regard it is possible that more cons.tructive. efforts will be forthcoming 
te Asian regional cooperation from. the Soviet Union. 
Mainland Ch.ina remains the biggest. problem, So far China has been 
hostile to Asian regionalism, which is presumably aimed against rising 
Chinese influence in Asia. Regardles.s of. its. recent behavior which s1,1g-
gested possible cooperatienwith the United. States, China will continue 
te cast an ominous.shadow over the Southeast. Asia peninsula for years to 
come, However, if countries of the.region succeed in forging a regional 
identity and cohesiveness, they will. have. a better chance of persuading 
China to change its hostile foreign policy against them. A strong Asian 
solidarity and a reduced American military posture should lessen the 
Chinese threat, This is.not to argue that. regional groupings of the 
states in the area will be strong enough. to .contain China, but· with the 
removal of what China considers to be a major military threat and the 
creation of a more united regional position vis,-a-vis China, perhaps 
China will be willing to relax its activities in the region, Thailand 
has offered to begin a dialogue with Peking, and so have most, if not 
all, Southeast Asian states. So far. nothing. concrete has resulted; 
China has not yet fully disclosed its position regarding the issue. 
Also, Thailand has contemplated the possibility thatASEAN may conduct 
collectively talks with China •. Stability in. Southeast Asia cannot be 
brought about. without China's cooperation •. 
One last country that merits consideration is North Vietnam, After 
the Vietnam war is settled, it is conceivable that North Vietnam is. 
likely to emerge as a regional. power •. Ye.t, its capability to wage war 
in Southeast Asia in the future would be limited because the country has 
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suffered heavy losses. in the present. war ...... Th.e task of reconstructing a 
war-torn.nation lies ahead for the North Vietnamese. North Vietnam 
might be.able.to exert some·degree of influence over.its neighbors".""-Laos 
and Cambodi~, since the leaderships. of. these. countries are very weak. 
In the long.run, however, North Vietnam might. consider cooperating with 
regional efforts aJ,.ready under way, s:fcnce. it,- too, will have to find a 
means tq cou'Qter Chinese influence. Oneshould.not forget that the 
Chinese and Vietnamese are themselves traditional enemies. The·North 
Vietnamese today have been able to evade Chines.e. domination because they 
have played the Soviet Union off against- the. Chinese. 
It may·be.concluded that peace and.stability cannot be established 
solely by. the countries of the region. But these .. difficulties ca.n come 
nearer to being resolved if the major.powers.pursue the right kind of. 
policies. The roles of the . United States.,. the. Soviet Union, China, 
Japan, and others are important to the idea of Asian solidarity. The 
United States has-already promised its .assistance in the Nixon Doctrine 
message •. The Soviet Union is expected. to ex.tend help. Japan and 
Australia have already become active. The results are encouraging to 
tqe Southeast Asian leaders. 
Through regionalism, Thailand has hoped that a.general settlement 
~ight .be.worked out. It .is in this respect that ASEAN--or some broader 
association of Asian states such as ASPAC,-:--mightbe able to make signif· 
icant contributions to stability in the ar~. by providing a frameworlc 
within which Southeast;: Asian nations can.cooper.ate .. If .t~ese organiza-
tions can merge into one organization- and.if.this. organization can ex.,. 
pand to include other Asian states, the prospects.f.or peac~keeping in 
the area will be greatly.enha.nced. Economic assistance from the major 
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powers can then be channeled into a regional grouping .. This would en-
able the region as an organized unit to work toward providing security 
in Southeast Asia. 
Present Thai foreign policy is oriented toward regionalism and 
sh9ulc;l. continue to be in the future. In the absence of the United 
Stat~s, regionalism is indeed the most appropriate choice for Thailand. 
Unless.drastic changes occur, Thailand has nooth~r real alternative but 
to emphasize the regional efforts reflected in its foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Southeast Asian international politics is now, as it has.been for 
the last hundred years, dominated by outside powers. By the end of the 
1960's, a triangular power struggle had developed in Southeast Asia in-
volving the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic 
of .. China. The Chinese Communist government has succeeded in making 
China ~ major power in the region. Thailand., along with other states in 
Southeast Asia, must face the reality of the growing power of China 
under a disciplined and determined regimewhich is capable of imposing 
hegemony.over all of Asia. The Thai government is unwilling to be in-
cluded within China's so-called "natural sphere of influence." This is 
the reason Thailand allied itself closely with the United States and 
the West in the 1950's.and the 1960's. The Thai-United States alliance 
grew out of a common interest in restraining Communist China and North 
Vietnam. 
For the United States, however, Southeast Asia is only a part of 
its vast array of interests. In the 1960's, the American government 
conceived its intervention in Sout~east Asia and especially in South 
Vietnam as a foreward strategy. in the defense .. of Japan, in the north, 
and Australia, in the south, as well as .the defense of Southeast Asia 
against Chinese control or influence. But the war in Vietnam has been 
costly. Thus, it is conceivable that the United States fears becoming 
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involved in another costly struggle in another Southeast Asian country. 
With the .enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States has indi-
cated its intention to withdraw from Southeast Asia, Since Thailand has 
been so dependent upon the.United States,for. its. security, it must pre-
pare for the change that is antic~pated. 
The aim of this study has been to investigate policy alternatives 
open to Thailand under the assumption th.at the. United.States is drasti-
cally reducing its military commitment to Southeast Asia, There are 
four major alternatives which the Thai government might pursue; however, 
it was.found that only one.alternative. is. feasible, given the current 
internal political situation and the illlI1'ediate external environment. 
Given Thailan.d 's histori~al pattern of. responding to the interna-
tional environment, its geographical location, its economic interests, 
the ideological characteristics of its leadership, it was found that 
Thailand is.unlikely to pursue an accommodation. toward China, nor is it 
likely to align with the Soviet Union. In the case of China, it was 
found that Thailand's relationship with that particular country is by 
and larged dominated by fear.of China's power and influence. The ruling 
element in Thailand is the military group.which views China as a major 
threat to its own internal political position. Fear of the powerful 
neighbor to the north and the affluent Chinese.minority in Thailand was 
evident in .the many anti-Chinese measures. adopted by the government at 
various times. Also, it was found that Thailand.' s. economic interests 
would not be served by an alignment with China, China and Thailand, 
given their levels of development, do not seem to have complementary 
trading economies. Since the two economies. are mutually exclusive, the 
potential for trade relationships is limited, China is unlikely to 
120 
extend aid to Thailand for its economic.davel9pment. Also, changes.that 
are taking place in the international environment are not so drastic 
that Thailand is .. required to submit tc;,. Chinese. power. 
In reference to a possible alignment. wi:t;h. the Soviet Union, it was 
found that the Soviet .Union's interests in Southeast Asia are not as 
great as they are in South Asia. Geographically, Southeast Asia is .. some 
distance from; the Soviet Unic;m. While the Soviet Union has expanded i,ts 
diplomatic activities in the region., it .. has. no.t indicated a major drive 
to establish a significant position of power. there. However, with the 
withdrawal of United States' military. commitments in the region, it is 
conceivable that the Soviet Union will change. the. pace. af its activities 
in Southeast Asia. If this does .. happen.,. Thailand. may be forced to ad-
just to the.intrusion by making accommodations.with the Soviet.Union. 
The Sov:J_et proposal for an Asian sec1,1rity.system has been used 
mainly as a device to win cooperation from. India.and to establish its 
influence in South Asia. Thailand, over the.years, has become skeptical. 
of the usefulness of multi-national security. systems. Its experience 
with SEATO, and its close association with. the major powers'in.that 
organization proved to be unsatisfactory.. Thailand was. forced into a 
special relationship with the United States. to guarantee its s~curity. 
Further it was .. found that while Thailand has. sought trade with the 
Sovi~t Union and the Eastern European countries, .. trade with these coun-
tries has been statistically insignificant .•. Under the current c~rcum-
stances it must be concluded that Thailand will not seek an alignment 
with the Soviet Union. 
Neutralism was also considered as.an alternative policy. It was 
found that neutralism is not a suitable foreign policy for Thailand. 
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The external political forces and the. domestic. situation render this 
policy untenable. The Communist threat.within. Thailand is too closely 
linked with the external pressures that.Thailand confronts. In the 
past, Thailand's geographical location. provided a workable buffer be;-
tween France and Great Britain. These two.powers agreed to the buffer 
and neither attempted to. subvert the government of Thailand t~ its spe-
cial interest. At the present time,. it was. f.i;,und.that_no structure of 
international power relationships exists.which.would permit Thailand to 
become a buffer sf;:ate and thereby neutral .•. Since the United States has 
been the major power.in Southeast Asia, geographical.position and polit-
ical circumstances have prevented Thailand. fr.om. becom:f.ng. a buffer state. 
American power has been asserted.in Vietnam. and Laos whicl?, are located 
to the east.of Thailand and south of China .... Thailand's.geographical. 
position off to one.side under these circumstances. did not enaQle it to 
hold a buffer position. Even if·the geographical. circumstances per-
mitted a buffer state, the antagonism of. the. governing elite in Thailand 
toward the Communists did not enable. it. to. accept a neutral status. The 
political. instability within the states of: the. region and the tenous · 
power commitments of.the.major antagonists .(China anc,l. the United States) 
in the region also prevented a genuine.neutralization of any part of 
Southeast·Asia, including Thailand. If American power is replaced by. 
Soviet power in the.region vis-a-vis China~ it is. douQtful whether_ 
political conditions in the foreseeable future.would change sufficiently. 
to permit Thailand alone to purs~e a.neutralist.policy •. It·would take 
some time for power relationships in. the. region. to. stabilize and, in the 
interim, internal pressures, assisted perhaps .. by. China and the Soviet 
Union, can.be expected to continue against the established Thai 
government. It must be concluded under.these circumstances that neu-
tralism is not a viable option. 
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Another finding of this study is-that a.foreign policy which seeks 
regional cooperation among the states in the.area is the most.viable 
option for Thailand and would be the most.appealing to its ruling elite.· 
This policy would be in harmony.with the. nationalist element of the Thai 
leadership in the sense·that it.would reduce Thai dependence on the 
major powers, and would enable the Thai elite to continue to oppose 
Conununist threats to its position of power .•. Political pressure against 
the established government.inspired by the. Communists could be resisted 
with some measure of outside support. At.the. same time, this.policy 
would incre.l;l,se Thailand'' s political influence in. regional matters. In . 
terms of cooperation, it was found that most . .st.ates _in the region do 
possess conunon problems and interests.. Thailand.' s interest in ecomomic 
development could be served thrqugh cooperative.planning efforts among 
the states of the area. There is some. evidence that regional coopera-
tion through such organizations.as ASEAN and.ASPAC has. already contrib-
uted to political, economic, cultural, and. social development. 
Further it was found that regional cooperation among the Southeast 
Asian states is compatible with the nation.al interests of some of the 
major powers. There is evidence that the. United States _will play a con~ 
structive role in helping to bring about unity among the Asian nations. 
The Nixon Doctrine asserts that solutions to.major. problems must be 
regionally developed. American assistance, compatible with United 
States national interests, is more likely to be given if substantial 
regional efforts are in evidence. A collllllitment of American military 
power in the background, if it can be acquired, could contribute to the 
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security of the regional.arrangement.vis,,...a,.,-vis . .other powers. Perhaps, 
through.big-power diplomatic efforts, the. security of the region could 
be affirmed. This, undoubtedly, would. require r.egional neutralization. 
Such an arrangement could possibly bring. an. end .. t.o nu,1Jor military. con-
flicts in the region and provide political .condi.tians that wo'Ll,ld facili-
tate the flow of developmental aid •. Thus, it.must. be concluded that the 
option of promoting regional cooperation. is the.most feasible foreign 
policy for Thailand as it plans for the. immediate future. Thailand 
should continue its leadership role.in the.development of regional unity 
in Southeast Asia and should work with. other states of.the region to 
develop beneficial political and economic relationships in the broader 
Asian and Pacific environment. It should cultivate, along with other 
states of the Southeast Asian region, relationships with the major world 
powers.that will contribute to the security of the region, The big 
powers should be encouraged to agree to the. neutralization of the entire 
region once the Vietnam war has been concluded •. 
Although the policy alter"Q.atives available to Thailand were ana-
lyzed on the .basis of historical, economic., geographical, and political 
factors, the hypotheses which were set forth. in this study were sup-
ported mainly.by the historical and political variables. There wer~ 
insufficient indices of.the geographical and. economic variables to per-
mit-extensive analysis along these lines, . This is recognized as a 
serious shortcoming of the study. 
Although considerable attention was given to the analysis of the 
impact of the People's Republic of China as a major power in Southeast 
Asia, almost no consideration was given to the role of North Vietnam 
which in the future might exercise considerable influence in the region. 
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